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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore an alternative strategic focus for the 
Department of Defense to implement in the conduct of the Global War on Terrorism.  
Our thesis is as follows:  A non-conventional approach to strategic policy, led by an 
enhanced Foreign Internal Defense concept, and judicious execution of US Sponsored 
Unconventional Warfare, applied as a primary tool of U.S. national policy through the 
Department of Defense, will serve as an effective solution to the global “terrorist” threat. 
This paper will justify such by analyzing the historical conduct of the United 
States through the framework of its own doctrine and the “Mystic Diamond” a 
State/Counter-state dynamic model as presented by Dr. Gordon McCormick.  Elements 
of the Department of Defense and the Department of State know the operational strategy 
to take, but are hampered by the misapplication of counter-guerilla tactics as strategy, and 
are reluctant to use sponsored UW to preempt or curtail the exportation of terrorism.  In 
essence, the Department of Defense has been and continues to be limited by its 
conventional tactical successes, when what is required is strategic application of FID, 
UW, and limited Direct Engagement to defeat an enemy employing a non-conventional 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Today we are engaged in a global counterinsurgency, an unprecedented 
challenge which requires a level of original strategic thought and depth of 
understanding perhaps comparable only to that of the Cold War. 
       --David W. Barno1 
A. PURPOSE/THESIS STATEMENT 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore an alternative strategic focus for the 
Department of Defense (DoD) to implement in the conduct of the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT).  Our thesis is as follows:  A non-conventional approach to strategic 
policy, led by an enhanced Foreign Internal Defense concept, and judicious execution of 
US Sponsored Unconventional Warfare, applied as a primary tool of U.S. national policy 
through the Department of Defense, will serve as an effective solution to the global 
“terrorist” threat.  This paper will justify such by analyzing the historical conduct of the 
United States through the framework of its own doctrine and the “Mystic Diamond” a 
State/Counter-state dynamic model as presented by Dr. Gordon McCormick.  Elements of 
the Department of Defense and the Department of State know the operational strategy to 
take, but are hampered by the misapplication of counter-guerilla tactics as strategy, and 
are reluctant to use sponsored UW to preempt or curtail the exportation of terrorism.  In 
essence, the Department of Defense has been and continues to be limited by its 
conventional tactical successes, when what is required is strategic application of FID, 
UW, and limited Direct Engagement to defeat an enemy employing a non-conventional 
method of engagement.2 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is written with the assumption that the reader has knowledge of Dr. 
Gordon McCormick’s State/Counter-state model, the “Mystic Diamond.”  An 
explanation of the “Mystic Diamond” can be found at the end of this chapter and it is 
recommended that the reader understand the “Mystic Diamond” prior to reading the 
thesis. We will apply the following methodology:  The remainder of Chapter I will 
                                                 
1 David W. Barno, “Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency,” Parameters, (Summer 2006): 15. 
2 We understand the Irregular Warfare concept and have specifically steered away from it.  We feel the 
IW concept is just a catchall for everything not conventional. 
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examine the background surrounding GWOT and present Dr. McCormick’s 
State/Counter-state model.  Chapter II will discuss the GWOT problem, analyze the 
current U.S. and DoD strategy, discuss the shortcomings of that strategy, and determine 
the nature of the global insurgent threat.  Chapter III will draw parallels between the 
success and failures of the Cold War.  Chapter IV will propose an alternative strategy for 
DoD to follow.  Within chapter IV we will lay out a combination of the use of FID, UW, 
and Conventional attacks and examine cases where each has been successful or failed.  
Chapter V will analyze the proposed strategy to see if it is a balance strategy.  Chapter VI 
will provide a conclusion and some recommendations. 
We recognize that any strategy to combat the GWOT must apply all elements of 
national power (Diplomatic, Information Operations, Military, Economic, Law 
Enforcement, and Finance).  Since DoD does not have tasking authority this strategy does 
not address the other elements of national power.  This strategy does not address the 
specific problem of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
C. BACKGROUND  
Terrorism is not a new problem.  It has been around for centuries and during the 
1980’s and 1990’s Americans increasingly became targets of terrorism.  On September 
11, 2001 al Qaeda3 escalated the magnitude of terrorism when it conducted an attack 
against the United States.  The attack killed 3056 personnel from 90 different countries 
on American soil.4  The scale of terrorism dramatically increased from occasional 
bombings abroad and plane hijackings to coordinated attacks on U.S. soil.   
Looking at al Qaeda’s attacks through the lens of the Dr. Gordon McCormick’s 
Mystic Diamond, its purpose was to attack the U.S. directly and erode the support of the 
population.  The attack may have been against U.S. citizens, but “their political-strategic 
targets are the decisionmakers [sic] and influencing elites in the United States and in the 
global community.”5 
                                                 
3 Al Qaeda is spelled in numerous ways.  The authors will use this spelling unless directly quoting 
from a source that has it spelled another way. 
4 “September 11, 2001: Basic Facts,” U.S. Department of State, 12 August 2002 [Website]; available 
from http://www.state.gov/coalition/cr/fs/12701.htm; Internet; accessed 29 January 2007. 
 5 Barno, 19. 
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Shortly after September 11, 2001 the United States conducted unconventional 
warfare operations against the Taliban of Afghanistan in order to conduct a regime 
change and kill or capture al Qaeda members.  In January 2002 the United States, in 
conjunction with Philippine forces, began conducting Foreign Internal Defense 
operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group.  In March 2003 the U.S. conducted a 
conventional attack against Iraq in order to conduct regime change.   
Currently the U.S. is still engaged in conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) 
operations in all three of these countries with varying results.  In Afghanistan, COIN 
operations have become increasingly conventional.6  The U.S. military is surging 
additional forces into Iraq to help stem a deteriorating situation.    In the Philippines and 
South East Asia the U.S. is using an indirect approach [less kinetic] to conduct COIN 
operations with better results.7   
D. GORDON MCCORMICK’S STATE/COUNTER-STATE MODEL, THE 
“MYSTIC DIAMOND”8 
The “Mystic Diamond” is a state/counter-state model that was developed by Dr. 
Gordon McCormick of the Naval Postgraduate School.  His model presents a feasible 
strategy that could be adopted by forces [the state] fighting an insurgency.  The “Mystic 
Diamond” incorporates all elements of national power and can be applied at the strategic, 








                                                 
6 John R. Dyke and John R. Crisafulli, “Unconventional Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan,” 
(Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 7-9. 
7 David P. Fridovich and Fred T. Krawchuk, “Winning in the Pacific: The Special Operations Forces 
Indirect Approach,” Joint Force Quarterly 44, 2007, 26. 




Figure 1.   Dr. Gordon McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond” Model.  (From: Intro to 
Guerrilla Warfare) 9 
 
The “Mystic Diamond” consists of four parties, the state, the counter-state, the 
population, and the international community.  Each party will be defined as follows: 
State-The state is the current government or occupying force that controls the 
country or nation.  The state is in direct conflict with the counter-state for control of the 
country or nation and the support of the population.  The state controls the 
counterinsurgency forces.   
• Counter State-The group or element that is conducting insurgent operations 
against the state.  The counter-state is in direct conflict with the state for the  
 
 






















control of country or nation and the support of the population.  The counter-state 
controls the insurgent forces.  The counter-state may or may not have 
international support. 
• Population-The residents of the disputed country or nation that neither actively 
support the counter-state nor are part of the state apparatus. 
• International Community-Other countries or nations as well as non-governmental 
organizations that are external to the state and counter-state.  Elements of the 
international community may or may not support the state or counter-state. 
The state and counter-state are competing for the control of the country or state, 
the population’s support and the support of international sponsors.  Initially each has an 
advantage.  The state has a force and resource advantage.  The counter-state starts out 
with an information advantage.  The state has the capability to fight the insurgents, but 
lacks the information of where to locate the insurgents.  The counter-state has the 
information of where to locate the state’s forces and infrastructure, but lacks the forces 
and resources to do so.  Both the state and counter-state have the following [operational] 
strategies to use in the conduct of insurgent and counter-insurgent operations: 
Available [Operational] Strategies: 
1. Extend infrastructure domestically.  Both the state and counter-state attempt to 
gain the support of the population.  The state does this by providing the necessary 
services and the security that the population needs to feel safe.  The counter-state 
does this by undermining the state’s efforts and stepping in to fill the void. 
2. Operate indirectly and attack the state’s or counter-state’s infrastructure.  Each 
side attempts to show that the other side is illegitimate in the eyes of the 
population thereby decreasing the support of the population. 
3. Attack the state or counter-state directly.   Each side attacks the other directly.  
Typical conventional force-on- force operations with the intent to kill, capture, or 
disrupt the enemy. 
4. Operate indirectly and attack state’s or counter-state’s International infrastructure.  
Each side attempts to disrupt the other’s support from the international 





5.   Extend infrastructure internationally.    Each side attempts to gain the support of 
the international community.  A show of support could be both active support in 
the form of aid to either the state or counter-state or a lack of support to the 
opposition. 
As the state or counter-state conducts its [operational] strategy it will receive 
feedback.  The feedback for the state may be additional intelligence and support from the 
population as well as a decrease in support to the counter-state.  The strategies should be 
conducted in order, but if a target presents itself the state or counter-state should take the 
opportunity.  If the state is capable it can conduct strategies 1, 2, 4, and 5 simultaneously. 
In the next chapter we will analyze the current U.S. and DoD GWOT strategy 
showing that it emphasizes the direct approach, discuss the GWOT problem, and 
highlight its shortfalls.  Additionally we examine the threat and show that an indirect 




II. THE GWOT PROBLEM  
Fighting a world war is not new to America - neither is fighting an ideology.  In 
the 20th Century the U.S. successfully fought two world wars, the second of which was 
followed by a “Cold War”.  The world wars were against conventional enemies and the 
U.S. defeated those enemies conventionally.  The “Cold War” had a conventional enemy, 
but also had an ideology that was being spread as a direct challenge to democracy.  The 
U.S. could not engage the U.S.S.R. in a direct conventional manner for fear of escalating 
the conflict to nuclear war; instead the U.S. engaged the U.S.S.R. indirectly by 
supporting and countering insurgencies.   
The enemy in the GWOT is not a conventional enemy, yet the Department of 
Defense is using a direct conventional method primarily focused in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
The battles DoD continues to fight are to hold onto the initial successes of those two 
campaigns.  The main problem behind this is a strategy that relies primarily on a tactical 
direct approach, and focuses on conventional attrition of the enemy ranks.  Looking at the 
GWOT through Dr. Gordon McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond” the U.S. is primarily 
attempting to attack al Qaeda directly. 
The primary problems with the current GWOT strategy are:  
• The GWOT strategy primarily focuses on the enemy insurgent fighters and 
command and control elements, and not the recognized irregular center of 
gravity…the population. 
• Primary focus on Afghanistan and Iraq, and not towards stemming potential 
insurgent hotbeds both in South East, and South Asia. 
In addition some select constraints and limitations as well as the threat must be analyzed. 
Through the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2006 (NSCT) the 
President lays out the achievements the U.S. has made during the conduct of the GWOT.  
These successes are: 
• We have deprived al-Qaida of safehaven [sic] in Afghanistan and helped a 
democratic government to rise in its place. Once a terrorist sanctuary ruled by 
the repressive Taliban regime, Afghanistan is now a full partner in the War on 
Terror. 
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• A multinational coalition joined by the Iraqis is aggressively prosecuting the 
war against the terrorists in Iraq. Together, we are working to secure a united, 
stable, and democratic Iraq, now a new War on Terror ally in the heart of the 
Middle East. 
• We have significantly degraded the al-Qaida network. Most of those in the al-
Qaida network responsible for the September 11 attacks, including the plot’s 
mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, have been captured or killed. We 
also have killed other key al-Qaida members, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 
the group’s operational commander in Iraq who led a campaign of terror that 
took the lives of countless American forces and innocent Iraqis. 
• We have led an unprecedented international campaign to combat terrorist 
financing that has made it harder, costlier, and riskier for al-Qaida and related 
terrorist groups to raise and move money. 
• There is a broad and growing global consensus that the deliberate targeting of 
innocents is never justified by any calling or cause. 
• Many nations have rallied to fight terrorism, with unprecedented cooperation 
on law enforcement, intelligence, military, and diplomatic activity. 
• We have strengthened our ability to disrupt and help prevent future attacks in 
the Homeland by enhancing our counterterrorism architecture through the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Director of 
National Intelligence, and the National Counterterrorism Center. Overall, the 
United States and our partners have disrupted several serious plots since 
September 11, including al-Qaida plots to attack inside the United States. 
• Numerous countries that were part of the problem before September 11 are 
now increasingly becoming part of the solution – and this transformation has 
occurred without destabilizing friendly regimes in key regions.10 
Although progress has been made, significant challenges still face the United States.  The 
NSCT lays out the following challenges: 
• Terrorist networks today are more dispersed and less centralized. They are 
more reliant on smaller cells inspired by a common ideology and less directed 
by a central command structure. 
• While the United States Government and its partners have thwarted many 
attacks, we have not been able to prevent them all. Terrorists have struck in 
many places throughout the world, from Bali to Beslan to Baghdad. 
• While we have substantially improved our air, land, sea, and border security, 
our Homeland is not immune from attack. 
                                                 
10 The White House, The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, (Washington DC: Executive 
Office of the President, September 2006), 3-4. 
 9 
• Terrorists have declared their intention to acquire and use weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) to inflict even more catastrophic attacks against the 
United States, our allies, partners, and other interests around the world. 
• Some states, such as Syria and Iran, continue to harbor terrorists at home and 
sponsor terrorist activity abroad. 
• The ongoing fight for freedom in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist 
propaganda as a rallying cry. 
• Increasingly sophisticated use of the Internet and media has enabled our 
terrorist enemies to communicate, recruit, train, rally support, proselytize, and 
spread their propaganda without risking personal contact.11 
A. CURRENT STRATEGY SHORT FALLS 
1. National Strategy 
The United States Government revamped the National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism from the goals of February 2003: 
• Defeat Terrorists and Their Organizations. 
• Deny Sponsorship, Support, and Sanctuary to Terrorists. 
• Diminish the Underlying Conditions that Terrorists Seek to Exploit. 
• Defend U.S. Citizens and Interests at Home and Abroad.12 
to a more realistic approach that establishes short and long-term goals. The National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006 list the following short-term 
objectives: 
• Prevent attacks by terrorist networks. 
• Deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them. 
• Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states. 
• Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching 
pad for terror.13 
The long-term objective is: 
• Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of 
terrorism.14 
                                                 
11 The White House, The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, 4. 
12 The White House, The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, (Washington DC: Executive 
Office of the President, February 2003), 15-24. 
13 The White House, The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, 11-16. 
14 Ibid., 9. 
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The President’s strategic vision clearly implies a direct method of engagement.   
In the short run, the fight involves the application of all instruments of 
national power and influence to kill or capture the terrorists [author’s 
emphasis added]; deny them safehaven [sic] and control of any nation; 
prevent them from gaining access to WMD; render potential terrorist 
targets less attractive by strengthening security; and cut off their sources 
of funding and other resources they need to operate and survive.15 
When analyzing the strategic vision through the “Mystic Diamond” we see that 
the vision emphasizes operational strategy (OS) 3, directly targeting the terrorists.  The 
last element of the vision could be interpreted to use OS 1 and 5 to cut off the global 
population’s support for terrorism.  By analyzing the current strategy through the “Mystic 
Diamond” we see that the strategy uses a combination of direct and indirect methods of 
engagement, but still emphasizes the direct approach.   
• Prevent attacks by terrorist networks.16  Uses OS 3 of the “Mystic Diamond”.    
The U.S. and allies attack the terrorist directly.   
• Deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them.17  Uses 
OS 1 and 5 of the “Mystic Diamond”.   The U.S. is attempting to extend the 
WMD protection infrastructure both internally and internationally. 
• Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states.18  Uses OS 4.  The 
U.S. is using sanctions to put pressure on state sponsors of terrorism and 
disrupt the flow of resources from those states. 
• Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching 
pad for terror.19  Uses all operational strategies of the “Mystic Diamond”, but 
has an emphasis on OS 3.  The U.S. is helping the governments of Iraq and 
Afghanistan while attacking the terrorists directly.  Additionally the U.S. is 
attempting to gain international support for those fledging governments and 
show how the insurgencies within those countries are illegitimate. 
                                                 
15 The White House, The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, 7. 
16 Ibid., 11. 
17 Ibid., 13. 
18 Ibid., 15. 
19 Ibid., 16. 
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The long-term objective is: 
• Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of 
terrorism.20  Uses OS 1 and 5.  Attempting to influence the global population 
by spreading democracy and democratic governments. 
2. Department of Defense Strategy 
The current Department of Defense Strategy is the National Military Strategic 
Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT) dated 1 February 2006.  The NMSP-
WOT’s lists the following military strategic objectives: 
• Deny terrorists what they need to operate and survive. 
• Enable partner nations to counter terrorism. 
• Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials and 
increase capacity for consequence management. 
• Defeat terrorists and their organizations. 
• Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other 
U.S. Government agencies and partner nations. 
• Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support 
for terrorism.21 
While seeming non-kinetic and indirect, in reality the operational focus continues 
to favor the use of a conventional strategy.  By analyzing DoD’s strategy through the 
“Mystic Diamond” we see that the strategy uses a combination of direct and indirect 
methods of engagement, but still emphasizes the direct approach.   
• Deny terrorists what they need to operate and survive.22  Uses OS 3 and 5 of 
the “Mystic Diamond”.  The military will identify and attack critical parts of 
the terrorist network it can and will encourage and assist other countries to do 
the same. 
• Enable partner nations to counter terrorism.23  Uses OS 5 of the “Mystic 
Diamond”.  By enabling partner nations the military is attacking the terrorist 
infrastructure and popular support within those nations. 
• Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials and 
increase capacity for consequence management.24  Uses OS 1 and 5 of the 
                                                 
20 The White House, The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, 9. 
21 United States Department of Defense, The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on 
Terrorism, (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1 February 2006), 6-7. 
22 Ibid., 6. 
23 Ibid., 7. 
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“Mystic Diamond”.  The military is attempting to extend the WMD protection 
infrastructure both internally and internationally. 
• Defeat terrorists and their organizations.25  Uses OS 3 and 5 of the “Mystic 
Diamond” with emphasis on 3.  The military attempts to find and kill terrorists 
it can and assist and encourage partner nations to do the same. 
• Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other 
U.S. Government agencies and partner nations.26  Primarily uses OS 3, but 
also OS 5 of the “Mystic Diamond”.   
• Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support 
for terrorism.27  Uses all strategies of the “Mystic Diamond”.   
The DoD strategy is the better of the two strategies.  It not only focuses on 
defeating terrorists, but also on supporting partner nations.  The strategy should be 
reprioritized putting an emphasis on the indirect goals first and recognizing that the 
ability to influence the world population is what will win the war.  Direct methods should 
be seen as supplemental support to erode the insurgent mechanism, or utilized as targets 
of opportunity arise. 
The U.S. would do well to draft a new national strategy similar to the NMSP-
WOT, but recognize and emphasize that the world population is the center of gravity for 
the terrorists.  Without support of the population an insurgent can not survive.   
In addition to the NMSP-WOT the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
(QDR) was reviewed.  The QDR is DoD’s analysis of how the DoD is conducting 
business…it is its’ report card.  The 2006 QDR is important because it “is submitted in 
the fifth year of this long war.”28  The QDR calls for the development of five 
“roadmaps”: 
• Department institutional reform and governance. 
• Irregular Warfare. 
• Building partnership capacity. 
                                                 
24 United States Department of Defense, The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on 




28 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington, DC: 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 6 February 2006), v. 
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• Strategic communication. 
• Intelligence.29 
All have importance in fighting the GWOT, but the last four have a direct impact on the 
GWOT.  By looking at the “roadmaps” it appears that the QDR proposes using OS 1, 2, 
4, and 5.  The first “roadmap” will strengthen the domestic infrastructure by using OS 1.  
Irregular warfare will apply OS 2 and 4 to attack the enemies’ infrastructure.  Building 
partnership capacity will use OS 4 and 5.  Strategic communication will use all 
operational strategies.  It helps to strengthen domestic and international support and can 
be used to directly attack the enemy’s ideology.  Intelligence lays the foundation to 
enable all operational strategies to be used. 
Further examination of the QDR shows that it calls for greater emphasis on, 
Irregular Warfare, and using an indirect approach to the GWOT; yet there is also 
emphasis on finding, attacking, and disrupting terrorist networks.  The QDR says all of 
the right things, yet the following statement sends a confusing message: 
The QDR is not a programmatic or budget document.  Instead, it reflects 
the thinking of the senior civilian and military leaders of the Department 
of Defense: 
• Need to “find, fix and finish” combat operations against new and 
elusive foes.30 
Through the lens of the “Mystic Diamond” the NMSP-WOT appears to be a 
balanced strategy and the QDR makes the proper recommendations, but looking at the 
results you see that DoD is not really following its strategy or the recommendations in the 
QDR.  This is due to the fact the majority of the U.S. priority and effort are in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
B. FOCUS ON AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ 
Currently, the struggle is centered in Iraq and Afghanistan, but we will 
need to be prepared and arranged to successfully defend our Nation and its 
interests around the globe for years to come. 
   --2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report31 
                                                 
29 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington, DC: 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 6 February 2006), 2. 
30 Ibid., vi. 
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The Country Reports on Terrorism 2005 lists 11,111 terrorist incidents that 
occurred world wide resulting in 14,602 noncombatant deaths of which 3,963 (35%) of 
those incidents were in Iraq and Afghanistan.32  Although the data may be questionable 
the United States military is primarily concentrating its efforts on the 35%.  The use of a 
direct method has resulted in an increase in the death toll of U.S. forces in Operations 
Enduring Freedom,33 (OEF) Afghanistan, and Iraqi Freedom,34 (OIF) Iraq, has steadily 
increased since 2001 and 2003 respectively. 
The U.S. cannot continue to operate this way.  The adversary necessitates the use 
of non-conventional methods and forces to either preempt or subvert nations or regional 
powers concentrating their efforts against the U.S.  Short of deploying infantry divisions 
for every contingency, the United States can and must deter and defend against such 
world wide insurgent inception and propagation.  We can easily see the need to focus on 
al Qaeda, but such principles of strategy can be applied broadly, within the context of the 
specific country or regional situation, to serve in the United States’ security concerns. 
The next section will examine some of the constraints and limitations that were 
used to help formulate an alternate strategy for the conduct of the GWOT.   
C. FURTHER CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS 
There are several constraints and limitations that must be analyzed in the 
development of a new strategy. The following are selected constraints the U.S. faces:  
 
                                                 
31 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, v. 
32  United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005, (Washington DC: Office 
of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2006), National Counterterrorism Center: Country Reports 
on Terrorism 2005, Statistical Annex, vi. 
33 In 2001 there were 11* U.S. deaths.  In 2006 there were 98 U.S. deaths.  *Conflicting numbers 
between two sources for more information see “Fallen Warriors,” Defend America, U.S. Department of 
Defense News about the War on Terror, (n.d.) [Website]; available from 
http://www.defendamerica.mil/fallen.html; Internet; accessed 31 January 2007 and “Operation Enduring 
Freedom: Coalition Deaths by Year,” iCasualties.org, (n.d.) [Website]; available from 
http://www.icasualties.org/oef/DeathsByYear.aspx; Internet; accessed 31 January 2007. 
34 In 2003 there were 481* U.S. deaths.  In 2006 there were 818.  Conflicting numbers between two 
sources for more information see “Fallen Warriors,” Defend America, U.S. Department of Defense News 
about the War on Terror, (n.d.) [Website]; available from http://www.defendamerica.mil/fallen.html; 
Internet; accessed 31 January 2007 and “Iraq Coalition Casualties Count,” iCasualties.org, (n.d.) 
[Website]; available from http://www.icasualties.org/oif/; Internet; accessed 31 January 2007. 
 15 
• Political Environment. 




1. Political Environment 
The political environment is very complex.  In the conduct of GWOT the 
President must deal not only with the domestic political situation, but international 
political landscape as well.  Today the President has to fight the GWOT, deal with the 
Iranian and North Korea issues, and after the November 2006 Congressional elections, 
contend with a Congress that is not overly supportive of the war in Iraq. 
A direct method of engagement draws a lot of media attention and the global 
audience closely scrutinizes the United States’ actions.  A conventional approach requires 
moving mass amounts of troops and equipment, which in turn requires the support of 
allied countries.  Whether it is basing rights or the ability to use ports and airfields to 
refuel and offload equipment, the U.S. needs the cooperation of allied countries.  An 
indirect approach also requires the cooperation and support of allied countries, but the 
signature of U.S. forces is considerably smaller.  The United States’ current strategy is 
drawing much criticism and therefore its allies are under intense pressure.  These major 
muscle movements of the United States military, in support of any President’s peace time 
or war time engagement strategy, will draw scrutiny from and be limited by the attitude 
of not only the domestic, but also the global population.   The problem faced is--how 
does DoD engage the perceived enemy or possible future foe without these emotional, 
but none-the-less invalid (with regards to political powers) restrictions? 
Since the end of WWII, one can count the number of “high intensity” conflicts 
that the US has been involved with on one hand.  And, half the time the outcomes of 
these primarily conventional conflicts have been dubious at best.  The Korean War is 
technically still being fought; South Vietnam was engulfed by communism in 
1973…only the first Gulf War and Operation Enduring Freedom have been successful in 
the stated goals.  One could argue the point of U.S. military action in Grenada, Panama or 
Kosovo, but in reality and with an understanding of High Intensity Conflict, these 
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examples amount to either large scale raids, or limited strikes.  What this shows, is that 
while the conventional military is good at its job of conventional confrontation, that 
confrontation for the United States has only occurred a small percentage of the time since 
WWII. 
Low Intensity conflict, on the other hand has played a predominant role in the 
deployment of US troops in support of National Security objectives.  During the entire 
Cold War, Special Operations Forces indirectly clashed with Soviet backed forces a 
majority of the time in multiple, global conflagrations.  This engagement, while recorded 
in the history books, goes relatively un-remarked.  Reason being those forces, their 
raisson d etre, and their capabilities basically allowed them to conduct global communist 
deterrent actions while remaining under the radar as we will exemplify in later chapters 
(as we will exemplify in later chapters). 
At the crux of the issue then, is this capability to defeat a global influence, as in 
the past, a superpower.  It can be asserted that the demise of the Soviet Union was not 
due to the clash of two militaries on either the conventional or nuclear battlefield, but to 
the slow, indirect military and informational engagements carried on by our nation’s FID 
and UW forces in places of seemingly little interest to the evening news. This, coupled 
with a diplomatic and economic foreign policy designed to strangle our adversary, carried 
the day.  Without this public hyper-scrutiny, such operations in South Asia, Central 
America, the Mediterranean, and South East Asia stemmed the tide of Soviet Expansion 
and allowed other elements of national power to work on weakening the foe from within.  
In essence, and as will be described in our FID section, the military, through non-
conventional operations (FID and UW) set the conditions to secure the United States on 
the global non-conventional battlefield, thus allowing a comprehensive foreign policy to 
engage. 
While conventional forces could definitely “secure” the battlefield as well, the 
cost of deployment, foreseeable mis-utilization of skills, and consistent public scrutiny, 
would mire the political landscape to such a degree that the simplest tactical maneuver of 
forces would have to pass a public “sniff test.”  Witness the current debate of surge forces 
to Iraq.   
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The Pew Global Attitudes Survey, June 13 2006 shows that in 9 out of the 10 
countries that had data from 2002 and 2006 there was a downturn in a favorable opinion 
of the U.S.35  U.S. citizens also continue to have dissatisfaction with the Nation’s 
direction, 63% of Americans polled are dissatisfied.36  A sample of some of the 
American polls, provided by PollingReport.com, regarding terrorism show U.S. 
disapproval.37  
Congress is debating passing a bill showing a lack of support for the President and 
the War in Iraq.  Some recent Washington Post headlines show a snapshot of the internal 
debate about the U.S. involvement in Iraq. 
• “Bush’s Iraq Plan Meets Skepticism On Capitol Hill:  Opposition to Troop 
Increase Is Bipartisan.”38 
• “For GOP, Discord In Dissent On Iraq:  Senators With Doubts Over Bush 
Troop Plan Debate 5 Resolutions.”39 
• “Senators Unite On Challenge to Bush’s Troop Plan:  Revised Warner 
Language That Protects Funds Is Embraced for Bipartisan Appeal.”40 
                                                 
35 “America’s Image Slips, but Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas: No Global Warming 
Alarm in the U.S., China,” pewglobal.org, 13 June 2006 [Website]; available from 
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252; Internet; accessed 24 February 2007.  
36 Lydia Saas, “Americans Remain Disgruntled with Nation’s Direction: By contrast, majorities are 
satisfied with direction of state and local affairs,” The Gallup Poll, 22 January 2007 [Website]; available 
from http://www.galluppoll.com/content/default.aspx?ci=26215; Internet; accessed 31 January  2007. 
37 1/17-18/07 Newsweek Poll “…Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bush is handling terrorism 
and homeland security?” 53% disapprove, 43% approve, and 6% unsure.  1/12-14/07 USA Today/Gallup 
Poll “Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling terrorism?” 52% disapprove, 
46% approve, and 3 % unsure.  1/11/07 CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll “Do you approve or 
disapprove of the way George W. bush is handling terrorism?”  50% disapprove, 47% approve, and 3% 
unsure.  1/1-3/07 CBS News Poll “Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling 
the campaign against terrorism?” 51% disapprove, 43% approve, and 6% unsure.  Polls cited from “War on 
Terrorism,” PollingReport.com, 2007 [Website]; available from http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm; 
Internet; accessed 1 May 2007. 
38 Michael Abramowitz and Jonathan Weisman, “Bush’s Iraq Plan Meets Skepticism On Capitol Hill: 
Opposition to Troop Increase Is Bipartisan,” washingtonpost.com, 12 January 2007 [Website]; available 
from http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/11/AR2007011100437_pf.html; Internet; 
accessed 12 February 2007. 
39 Jonathan Weisman and Shailagh Murray, “For GOP, Discord In Dissent On Iraq: Senators With 
Doubts Over Bush Troop Plan Debate 5 Resolutions,” washingtonpost.com, 31 January 2007 [Website]; 
available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/01/30/AR2007013000456_pf.html; Internet; accessed 12 February 2007. 
40 Shailagh Murray and Jonathan Weisman, “Senators Unite On Challenge to Bush’s Troop Plan: 
Revised Warner Language That Protects Funds Is Embraced for Bipartisan Appeal,” washingtonpost.com, 
1 February 2007 [Website]; available from http://washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/01/29/AR2007012900164_pf.html; Internet; accessed 12 February 2007. 
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• “GOP Stalls Debate On Troop Increase:  Democrats Fall Short On War 
Resolution.”41 
• “Senate Leaders Continue Squabbling Over Iraq:  Little Progress Made on 
Nonbinding Resolution Against White House Plan to Add 21,500 troops.”42 
• “7 GOP Senators Back War Debate:  Lawmakers Had Blocked Action on 
Troop Resolution.”43 
To fight the GWOT is going to require not only the support of the American 
people, but of the world.  The U.S. needs to change its strategy to bolster that support.   
2. Operational Environment 
The dominant future form of the GWOT will likely be a protracted, 
indirect and clandestine fight in scores countries with which the US is not 
at war. 
      --Michael G. Vickers44 
A sampling of the current operational environment shows that it is diverse.  The 
U.S. is conducting counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 
Philippines.  In addition the State Department list 42 known terrorist groups on its 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations that are spread around the globe.  The terrorist 
organizations and concern groups affiliated/linked/associated to al Qaeda are believed to 
operate in at least 27 countries around the globe.45 
Within Iraq, coalition forces are conducting Stability, Security, Transition and 
Reconstruction (SSTR) operations in an increasingly violent country.  According to the 
Iraqi Study group, the violence stems from “the Sunni Arab insurgency, al Qaeda and 
                                                 
41 Jonathan Weisman and Shailagh Murray, “GOP Stalls Debate on Troop Increase: Democrats Fall 
Short On War Resolution,” washingtonpost.com, 6 February 2007 [Website]; available from 
http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/05/AR2007020500675_pf.html; Internet; 
accessed 12 February 2007. 
42 Shailagh Murray and Paul Kane, “Senate Leaders Continue Squabbling Over Iraq:  Little Progress 
Made on Nonbinding Resolution Against White House Plan to Add 21,500 Troops,” washingtonpost.com, 
7 February 2007 [Website]; available from http://washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/06/AR2007020600553_pf.html; Internet; accessed 12 February 2007. 
43 Shailagh Murray, “7 GOP Senators Back War Debate: Lawmakers Had Blocked Action on Troop 
Resolution,” washingtonpost.com, 8 February 2007 [Website]; available from 
http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/07/AR2007020702550_pf.html; Internet; 
accessed 12 February 2007. 
44 Michael G. Vickers, “Implementing GWOT Strategy: Overcoming Interagency Problems,” Center 
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 15 March 2006, 2. 
45 United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005, 183-262. 
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affiliated jihadist groups, Shiite militias and death squads, and organized criminality.”46  
Sectarian violence is caused by Sunni insurgent attacks on Shia civilians which in turn 
lead to reprisal attacks by Shiite militias on Sunni civilians.47  Two notable Shiite militias 
within Iraq are the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade.48  The Badr Brigade has ties to the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.  The insurgency and sectarian violence continue to 
undermine the Iraqi governments’ efforts for stability in Iraq.   
Within Afghanistan there are two ongoing military operations, Operation 
Enduring Freedom and the NATO-commanded International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF).49  “Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is a combat operation led by the United 
States against Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants, primarily in the eastern and southern parts 
of the country along the Pakistan border.”50  The purpose of the ISAF is the stabilization 
and reconstruction of Afghanistan.51  ISAF is compromised of 35,440 personnel from 36 
nations.52  The year 2006 saw an increase in violence in Afghanistan with a resurgence of 
the Taliban in southwest Afghanistan.53  “Insurgent tactics and operations against 
Coalition forces continue to evolve, and some maintain that they are becoming 
increasingly like the tactics employed in Iraq.”54   
Although the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) left Basilan Island two years after counter 
insurgency operations began, the U.S. military continues to work with the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines (AFP).55  Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) 
                                                 
46 James A. Baker III et al., The Iraq Study Group Report (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 3.  
47 Ibid., 4. 
48 Ibid., 5. 
49 Paul Gallis,, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance (Washington DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 3 January 2007), CRS-1. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., 
52 Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy (Washington DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 14 February 2007), CRS-47. 
53 Ibid.,, CRS-19-CRS-20. 
54 Andrew Feickert, U.S. and Coalition Military Operations in Afghanistan: Issues for Congress 
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 11 December 2006), CRS-7. 
55 Jeff McKaughan, “Pacific Warrior, Q&A: Building Capacity and Partnership Throughout the 
Region,” Special Operations Technology Volume 5 Issue 2, 2007 [Website]; available from 
http://www.special-operations-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1950; Internet; accessed 3 May 2007. 
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continues to advise and assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines in counterterrorism 
activities.56  Due to the transnational nature of the enemy U.S. operations have expanded 
to Indonesia and Malaysia with joint exercises and events.57 
When Ethiopia invaded Somalia in late 2006, the U.S. saw that as an opportunity 
to expand the GWOT and strike at al Qaeda terrorists residing in Somalia.  The U.S. 
appeared to have conducted a surgical strike versus a more long-term presence.  On 7 
January 2007 “a U.S. Air Force AC-130 gunship attacked suspected al-Qaeda members 
in southern Somalia”.58  In addition to the attack the Navy repositioned a carrier and 
other surface ships to prevent al-Qaeda from fleeing Somalia by sea.59  At the time of this 
writing, no further attacks on targets in Somalia have occurred, although it has been 
reported that U.S. personnel did go into Somalia to try and confirm if the intended target 
of the attack was in fact killed.60 
3. Manpower 
While the threat is diverse and appears to be infinite in nature, U.S. forces are 
finite.  As powerful as the United States is it does not have the ability to deploy 
conventional military forces to every country that has a terrorism/insurgent problem.  At 
the time of their research the Iraq Study Group estimated 141,000 U.S. service members 
are serving in Iraq.61  It is estimated that 12,000 U.S. service members are serving in 
Afghanistan.62  The deployments for Iraq have recently been increased to 15 months with 
a year back home before deployment again.  Additionally the U.S. has forces in Kosovo, 
                                                 
56 McKaughan. 
57 David P. Fridovich and Fred T. Krawchuk, 26-27. 
58 Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Strike in Somalia Targets Al-Qaeda Figure,” washingtonpost.com, 8 January 
2007 [Website]; available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/01/08/AR2007010801822_pf.html; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Stephanie McCrummen, “U.S. troops Went Into Somalia After Raid,” washingtonpost.com, 12 
January 2007 [Website]; available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/01/11/AR2007011102329_pf.html; Internet; accessed 12 March 2007. 
61 Baker et al., 6. 
62 The Associate Press, “NATO Troop Numbers in Afghanistan,” boston.com, 5 October 2006 
[Website]; available from 
http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2006/10/05/nato_troop_numbers_in_afghanistan/; 
Internet; accessed 22 February 2007. 
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the Sinai, and Korea.63  DoD has used National Guard Brigades to fulfill the Kosovo and 
Sinai commitments and to assist with duties in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Unfortunately this 
is a short-term fix, and “at some point, there will be no National Guard brigades that can 
be deployed without violating DoD’s mobilization standard.”64  
This huge conventional commitment may or may not be sustainable.  How long 
before soldiers are tired of rotating for a year to Iraq?  Another conventional incursion 
like Iraq would be detrimental to the well being of the military, yet the GWOT is more 
than just Iraq and Afghanistan. 
4. Financial 
In Steven M. Kosiak’s testimony to the U.S. Senate he states that over the past six 
fiscal years the GWOT has cost about $502 billion and another $93 billion is being 
requested for fiscal year 2007.65  “Military operations, reconstruction and other assistance 
to Iraq and Afghanistan account for, respectively, some $345-375 billion and $100 billion 
of this total.”66  
Using a direct approach that relies upon heavily armored conventional forces 
increases costs.  In 2006 the President requested an additional $72.4 billion to cover 
GWOT costs, for the remainder of the fiscal year 2006, of which $8.3 billion were 
allocated “to refurbish or replace equipment worn out or damaged through use in 
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.”67   
As the chart below shows, following the end of World War II and the end of the 
Cold War, the percentage of the Gross Domestic Product spent on defense (when not 
                                                 
63 Congressional Budget Office, “An Analysis of the U.S. Military’s Ability to Sustain an Occupation 
in Iraq:  An Update,” (Washington DC: Office of the Director, 5 October 2005), 4. 
64 Ibid., 7. 
65 Steven M. Kosiak, “The Global War on Terror (GWOT): Costs, Cost Growth and Estimating 
Funding Requirements,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 7 February 2007, 2. 
66 Kosiak, 2. 
67 Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: President Requests $72.4 billion for Global War on 
Terror,” The White House, February 16, 2006 [Website]; available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060216-11.html; Internet; accessed 22 February 
2007. 
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involved in a conventional conflict) was around five percent.68  The 2004 Federal budget 
deficit was $477 Billion while the national debt was estimated at $7.01 Trillion.69  There 
is not enough free money available to increase the defense budget enough to expand the 
number of conventional military personnel.70      
 
 
Figure 2.   Defense Budget as a Percent of GDP.  (From: FY 2007 Department of 
Defense Budget) 71 
 
5. Terminology 
The Global War on Terrorism has all of the characteristics of an 
insurgency: protracted, asymmetric violence, ambiguity, dispersal, the use 
of complex terrain, psychological warfare, and political mobilization 
                                                 
68 United States Department of Defense, “FY 2007 Department of Defense Budget,” Washington DC, 
6 February 2006 [briefing slide]; available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2006/d20060206slides.pdf; Internet; accessed 24 February 2007; 25. 
69 Ann McFeatters, “Federal budget deficit forecast to hit nearly $2.4 trillion over next decade,” post-
gazette, 27 January 2004 [Website] available from http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/04027/266028.stm; 
Internet; accessed 3 May 2007. 
70 Jason Brizek and Jeff Vish, “Rethinking the GWOT: Foreign Internal Defense as a Force 
Multiplier,” (Unpublished paper. Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006), 6.  
71 United States Department of Defense, “FY 2007 Department of Defense Budget,” 25. 
 23 
designed to protect the insurgents and eventually alter the balance of 
power in their favor; avoidance by insurgents of battlespaces [sic] where 
they are weak and a focus on those where they can compete, particularly 
the psychological and the political.72 
The U.S. declared war on terrorism.  Terrorism is a tactic not a strategy.  The 
threat the U.S. is facing is actually an insurgent threat, but since the U.S. has labeled this 
struggle as a Global War on Terrorism, the natural implication is to hunt down, capture, 
and kill terrorists.  Unfortunately the U.S. understanding is incorrect; this is a war against 
a global insurgency. 
This insurgency is not a single hierarchical organization, but fragmented 
groups united loosely behind a common ideology.73  If we simply target 
the terrorists, we miss the underlying supporting structure of the insurgent 
organization and the conditions that bring the groups their support.74  
If we look at DoD’s current Joint Publications and al Qaeda’s goals we will see 
that some US documents recognize that al Qaeda is an insurgency that is using terrorism 
as a tactic.  For instance, Joint Publication 1-02 defines an insurgency as: 
An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted 
government through use of subversion and armed conflict.75 
The same publication defines terrorism as: 
The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to 
inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies 
in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or 
ideological.76 
The State Department lists al Qaeda’s goals as: 
Al-Qaida’s goal is to unite Muslims to fight the United States as a means 
of defeating Israel, overthrowing regimes it deems "non-Islamic,” and 
                                                 
72 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: 
Reconceptualizing Threat and Response,” The Strategic Studies Institute, November 2004, 24-25. 
73 The White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” (Washington 
DC: Executive Office of the President, September 2002), as cited in Brizek and Vish, 7. 
74 Brizek and Vish, 7. 
75 United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, (Washington DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 April 2001 (As 
Amended Through 22 March 2007)), 265. 
76 Ibid., 540. 
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expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries. Its 
eventual goal would be establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate 
throughout the world.77 
In order to establish the caliphate al Qaeda would have to overthrow the 
established government of several countries, hence fitting the definition of an insurgency.  
Al Qaeda has resorted to terrorism in order to influence existing governments and the 
populations of those countries.  In Bard O’Neill’s insurgent classification al Qaeda would 
fall under the reactionary-traditionalist group, they [al Qaeda] want “to reestablish an 
ancient political system that they idealize as a golden age.”78  Al Qaeda has no standing 
army so the only way for it to wage any kind of warfare is through terrorism and guerrilla 
warfare.  Bard O’Neill describes there are three types of warfare open to insurgents; 
terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and conventional warfare.79  In Iraq and Afghanistan it can 
be argued that al Qaeda and its affiliates are waging guerrilla warfare against U.S. forces 
and the U.S. backed governments of those countries. 
D. THE THREAT  
A key consideration in developing a strategy is first defining the threat or enemy.  
What kind of enemy or threat is the U.S. currently facing?  Colonel Thomas X. Hammes 
describes today’s conventional threat to the U.S. as consisting of Korea, Iran, China, and 
unforeseen enemies.80  The Department of Defense is clearly suited to fight a 
conventional war against Korea, Iran, China, and an unforeseen enemy, but what about 
terrorism?  What is the global insurgent threat?  The NSCT states: 
…the principal terrorist enemy confronting the United States is a 
transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and 
individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – which have in 
common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends. 
This transnational movement is not monolithic. Although al-Qaida 
functions as the movement’s vanguard and remains, along with its affiliate 
groups and those inspired by them, the most dangerous present 
                                                 
77 United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005, 217.  
78 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse (Washington DC: 
Potomac Books, Inc., 2005), 21. 
79 O’Neill, 33. 
80 Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 
2004), 247-254. 
 25 
manifestation of the enemy, the movement is not controlled by any single 
individual, group, or state. What unites the movement is a common vision, 
a common set of ideas about the nature and destiny of the world, and a 
common goal of ushering in totalitarian rule. What unites the movement is 
the ideology of oppression, violence, and hate.81 
Many believe al Qaeda is the immediate threat, “but what we have currently is a 
broad and diverse movement of radical Islamic militancy.”82  The immediate enemy is 
the insurgent [unconventional] threat which is radical Islamic militancy.  The radical 
Islamic militant threat consists of: 
• Al Qaeda and radical Islamic militancy. 
• The ideology of Islamic extremism. 
• Terrorist Groups that are allied/linked/associated with al Qaeda. 
• Other Groups not allied/linked/associated with al Qaeda. 
• State sponsors of terrorism. 
The combination of these elements creates a global insurgent threat. 
1. Al Qaeda and Radical Islamic Militancy 
There is much more to al Qaeda than what most people belief or attribute to al 
Qaeda.  Jason Burke believes people have misunderstood al Qaeda.  “Bin Laden and al-
Qaeda are the radical, extremist fringe of the broad movement that is modern Islamic 
militancy.”83  Burke believes prior to 9-11 al Qaeda consisted of “three elements: a 
hardcore, a network of co-opted groups and an ideology.”84  The hardcore were those that 
were loyal to bin Laden.  The co-opted groups were local groups that had links to the 
hardcore al Qaeda. Burke uses the venture capitalists model as an analogy of how the 
hard core element would provide funds and resources for projects local groups would 
present.85  “Together these links, some tenuous, some more direct, allow us to speak of a 
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loose ‘network of networks’.”86  The third element is “the idea, worldview, ideology of 
‘al-Qaeda’ and those who subscribe to it.”87    
With the invasion of Afghanistan al Qaeda’s safe haven was lost, the core 
leadership of al Qaeda was forced to disperse, and the system they had in place has been 
disrupted.88  Personnel from the hard core element and the co-opted groups survived, but 
now there is more International pressure to disrupt the ‘network of networks’, yet new 
groups have sprung up.89 
Most activism is now by individuals who look up to bin Laden as a 
symbolic leader but are acting in style of al-Qaeda, along the agenda of al-
Qaeda but are not controlled in any meaningful way by ‘al-Qaeda’.  
Islamic militancy has lapsed into the chaotic variety that characterized the 
early nineties, except for one major factor: the efforts of Western 
governments, local regimes and security agencies across the world have 
been unable to break up the third element of al-Qaeda.  The idea of ‘al-
Qaeda’ – the precept, the maxim, the formula, not ‘the base’ – is more 
powerful than ever.90 
The Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism supports Burke’s 
analysis of al Qaeda.  The report says, “AQ’s core leadership continues to influence and 
provide ideological guidance to followers worldwide.”91   The same report states there is 
evidence that the core leaders have become frustrated by the lack of direct control and 
that al Qaeda’s global networks are beginning to break apart.92  “What was once a 
relatively structured network appeared to be a more diffuse worldwide movement of like-
minded individuals and small groups, sharing grievances and objectives, but not 
necessarily organized formally.”93 
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Jason Burke provides three meanings for the word al Qaeda.  “It could mean…a 
vanguard, a base or a maxim, precept, rule or methodology.”94  Burke believes each 
definition represents a phase that Islamic militancy has evolved through.95  
In the first phase, from around 1989 to around 1996, hundreds of activist 
who had been involved in the war against the Soviets or were fighting 
local struggles against regimes in the Middle East worked, often 
independently, at radicalizing and mobilizing those who had hitherto 
shunned extremism.  These activists saw themselves as ‘the vanguard’ – 
‘al-qaeda al-sulbahh’.96 
The second phase ‘the base’ was the period of bin Laden’s alliance with the Taliban 
when al Qaeda had a safe haven in Afghanistan.97  With the invasion of Afghanistan the 
second phase came to a close and the third phase began.  The third phase corresponds 
with the third translation that Burke provides, “the methodology, the maxim, the precept, 
the rule, the way of seeing the world.”98  The third phase and translation are the ideology 
an ideology that has its roots in Islamic extremism. 
2. The Ideology of Islamic Extremism 
A far bigger threat to the U.S. than the actual terrorist organizations is the 
ideology of Islamic extremism or what Marc Sageman refers to as the "Global Salafi 
jihad."99  "The Global Salafi jihad is a worldwide religious revivalist movement with the 
goal of reestablishing past Muslim glory in a great Islamist state stretching from Morocco 
to the Philippines, eliminating present international boundaries."100  The Global Salafi 
jihad "preaches salafiyyah…the restoration of authentic Islam, and advocates a strategy 
of violent jihad, resulting in an explosion of terror to wipe out what it regards as local 
political heresy."101  The Global Salafi jihad ideology has its roots in Wahhabism.   
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Wahhabism “is an austere form of Islam that insists on a literal interpretation of the 
Koran.102  Strict Wahhabis believe that all those who don't practice their form of Islam 
are heathens and enemies.”103   
Salafiyyah and Wahhabism have been used interchangeably because they both 
preach a conservative version of Islam although the historical roots of each differ.104 
"Modern Salafi beliefs grew from a reform-oriented movement of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, which developed in various parts of the Islamic world and 
progressively grew more conservative.”105  “Salafis generally believe that the Quran and 
the Prophet’s practices (hadith) are the ultimate religious authority in Islam”.106  
Blanchard states “Salafi interpretations of Islam appeal to a large number of Muslims 
worldwide who seek religious renewal in the face of modern challenges.”107  Wahhabism 
“is derived from the name of a Muslim scholar, Muhammad bin Abd al Wahhab,” who 
lived in the eighteen century, Abd al Wahhab was dissatisfied with the moral decline of 
society.108  He “encouraged a “return” to the pure and orthodox practice of the 
“fundamentals” of Islam, as embodied in the Quran and in the life of the Prophet 
Muhammad.”109  
Marc Sageman postulates there are three strategies available to the Salafi:  dawa, 
political activism, and Salafi jihad.  "Dawa (call to Islam in Arabic)" "advocates 
individual responsibility in spreading Islam to the rest of society through one's personal 
proselytism to convert others."110  Political activism attempts "to change society through 
state organs" and has led to the creation of Salafi political parties in Egypt (Muslim 
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Brotherhood) and India (Jamaat-i Islami).111  The founders of these parties "advocated 
the creation of a true Muslim state through imposition of the Sharia, which they viewed 
not only as the strict Quranic law but also as the practices of the salaf."112  Salafi jihad 
was a result of the repression by modern Muslim states.113  Sageman states the 
justification for jihad against fellow Muslims lies in the concept of jahiliyya.  Jahiliyya is 
"the state of barbarism and ignorance that prevailed in the Arabic Peninsula before 
Mohammed's revelations."114   
Two figures used jahiliyya to justify waging jihad on fellow Muslims, Mohamed 
ibn Abd al-Wahhab (founder of Wahhabism) and Sayyid Qutb.  Mohamed ibn Abd al-
Wahhab allied himself with Mohamed ibn Saud (eighteenth century) and used the 
concept of jahiliyya to conquer the Arabian Peninsula which led to the eventual creation 
of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.115  Abd al-Wahhab "based many of his Quranic 
interpretations on the fatwas of Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya".116  Taymiyya stated 
it the was duty of Muslims to wage jihad against the Mongol rulers because the Mongols 
followed Genghis Khan's Yasa legal code instead of Sharia and this made them apostates.  
In recent history Mawdudi (founder of Jamaat-i Islami) "resurrected the concept of 
jahiliyya in his writings as an abstract term to describe the system of beliefs and ideas of 
the times in India.117  Sageman goes on to say,   
Qutb took both Ibn Taymiyya's duty to wage jihad against apostates and 
Mawdudi's concept of jahiliyya out of context and combined them in a 
novel way, extending Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's ideas even further. 
Sayyid Qutb's influence on the Salafi jihad in general was crucial.  Afghan 
resistance leaders like Burnhanuddin Rabbani, who translated his works 
into Dari, were his disciples.  Some of the founders of al Qaeda--Ayman 
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al-Zawahiri, Ali Amin Ali al-Rashidi, and Subhi Muhammad Abu Sittah--
were Egyptian disciples who had sought refuge from political persecution 
in the Afghan jihad.118 
Qutb's interpretation helped to promote a violent radical ideology.  It is this ideology that 
helps give rise to new groups and creates a global threat. 
3. Terrorist Groups that are Allied/Linked/Associated with Al Qaeda 
The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005 lists several terrorist 
organizations and groups of concern that are allied/linked/associated/sympathetic with 
Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.  These groups would fall into Jason Burke’s co-opted 
groups’ category.  These terrorist organizations are: 
• Ansar al-Sunna (AS): Iraq. 
• Asbat al-Ansar:  Lebanon. 
• Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG): Egypt, U.K., Afghanistan, Yemen, and Europe. 
• Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU): Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, 
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.  
• Jemaah Islamiya Organization (JI): Indonesia, Malaysia, & Philippines. 
• Al-Jihad (AJ): historically Egypt, but primarily operate outside of Egypt in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, the United Kingdom, and Yemen.119 
• Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT): Pakistan.120   
• Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG):  Libya, believed to have spread to 
Asia, African, European, and Persian Gulf countries. 
• Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM):  Morocco, Western Europe, 
Canada, and Afghanistan. 
• Al-Qaida in Iraq:  Middle East, North Africa, Iran, South Asia, and Europe. 
• Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC): Algeria, the Sahel, Canada, and 
Western Europe.121 
The groups of concern are:  
• Al-Badhr Mujahedin (al-Badr): Jammu, Kashmir, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. 
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• Al-Ittihad al-Islamic (AIAI): Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and possibly 
Djibouti.122 
• East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM): Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and 
Kyrgyzstan. 
• Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI):  Pakistan and Kashmir. 
• Harakat-ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B):  Bangladesh. 
• Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG):  Afghanistan. 
• Islamic Army of Aden (IAA): Yemen . 
• Islamic Great Eastern Raiders-Front (IBDA-C): Turkey. 
• Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB): Russia, Chechnya, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey . 
• Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG): Western Europe and Afghanistan.123  
4. Other Groups Not Allied/Linked/Associated with Al Qaeda  
The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005 lists several terrorist 
organizations and groups of concern that are not allied/linked/associated/sympathetic 
with Osama bin Laden or al Qaeda, but are Islamic extremists groups or their ultimate 
goal is the establishment Islamic rule.  These organizations are: 
• Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG): Philippines. 
• Armed Islamic Group (GIA): Algeria, Sahel, and parts of Europe. 
• HAMAS: West Bank, Gaza Strip, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and Gulf States. 
• Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM): Pakistan. 
• Hizballah: Lebanon, Europe, North and South America, Asia, and Africa. 
• Islamic Jihad Group (IJU): Central and South Asia. 
• Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM): Pakistan. 
• Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ): anti-Shia group in Pakistan. 
• Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ): Israel, West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Syria.124 
The following are the groups of concern are: 
• Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM): Jammu, Kashmir, and Pakistan. 
• Jamaatul-Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB): Bangladesh. 
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• Kumpulan Mujahedin Malaysia (KMM): Indonesia and Malaysia. 
• People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD): South Africa. 
• Raja Solaiman Movement (RSM): Philippines. 
• Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs 
(RSRSBCM): Russia. 
• Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP): anti-Shia group in Pakistan. 
• Turkish Hizballah: Turkey.125 
5. State Sponsors of Terrorism 
State sponsors are a concern because they can act as support organizations 
providing resources and safe haven to the groups of the radical Islamic movement.  The 
current State sponsors of terrorism consist of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and 
Syria.126  As the GWOT has been waged the list has changed.  Libya’s cooperation with 
the U.S. has seen its name removed from the list.  Current negotiations with North Korea 
over its nuclear program are leading the U.S. to begin the process of removing North 
Korea from the state sponsors of terrorism list.127  There might be cases, such as Saudi 
Arabia and Pakistan, of non-state sponsors having competing governance within the state 
that may provide support to terrorists. 
As was mentioned earlier, today’s threat is both conventional and unconventional 
therefore any strategy developed to combat the GWOT should be sustainable and be able 
to counter a conventional threat while fighting the unconventional threat.  This concludes 
our analysis of the GWOT problem and some of the constraints and limitations 
surrounding the problem.  The next chapter will examine the “Cold War” and how it 
relates to the terrorist threat today.   
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III. WHAT LESSONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM PARALLELS 
BETWEEN THE COLD WAR AND THE GWOT/LONG WAR 
To fully understand the current global insurgent threat, we again look to the 
lessons of the Cold War.  As mentioned before, the extent to which conventional forces 
were employed with success on the conventional battlefield pales in relative comparison 
to the extent of which non-conventional forces were strategically deployed in order to set 
the global conditions against the spread of Communism.  By briefly analyzing the 
irregular conduct of the Cold War, and the similarities of the current “War” on terror, we 
can conclude consistencies in the nature of the threat, operational methods, and hopefully 
a more effective counterinsurgency strategy. 
During the Cold War, the United States fought the U.S.S.R., and its communist 
expansion primarily on the irregular battlefields i.e., Guatemala, Afghanistan, Greece, by 
bankrolling and “out-sourcing” U.S. support via hardware, logistics, money, and ideology 
to counter and contain communism.  By supporting either susceptible states with Foreign 
Internal Defense, or backing insurgency with unconventional warfare, the U.S. basically 
countered communism on a country by country, case by case situation.  Sometimes 
military advisors and State Department support were required, as in the case of El 
Salvador;128 sometimes the CIA/SF fought the UW conflict, as exemplified by actions in 
Iran, 1953, with the success of Operation AJAX - the agencies first foray and success in 
overthrowing an established power.129  Either way, one can see that the only time when 
Communism and the U.S. fought on the conventional battlefield, stalemate or defeat 
ensued (Korea, Vietnam) and that the United States only defeated Soviet backed 
communist expansion with irregular conflict.  One can conclude that while the U.S. 
prepared for conventional conflict, to include war on a nuclear battlefield, such a broad 
“U.S. vs. U.S.S.R.” conventional fight never occurred because neither country would nor 
could invade the other.  It can then be surmised, in the light of predominant conflict of 
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the Cold War era, and understanding the collective effect of managing elements of 
national power with indirect means, that the balance of power, rested in nuclear parity, 
prevented such a face off. 130 
We assert that the same holds true with the U.S. fight against global Islamic 
insurgency and exported support.  While not solidly represented by a monolithic evil that 
was the U.S.S.R., the same concepts and lessons can be applied to a common Islamic 
Jihad movement, not so popularly shunned by a moderate population, as the West might 
want to believe.  As referenced above, similarities will illuminate a reality that 
conventional U.S. conquest, against a state, state sponsored threat, or non-state actor, may 
be neither possible nor efficient, and that the only way to effectively fight a non-
conventional opponent (that is, no armies in the field) is with irregular action. 
The end of WWII saw the globe dominated by two superpowers vying for control 
over war-depleted, post-colonial environment.  It was in this beginning that scholars 
contend “the Soviet Union and countries within its sphere of influence [had] been 
training members of underground movements from various countries in the techniques of 
terrorism and guerrilla warfare.”131  Such action stands as direct product of Soviet policy 
and motives for supporting insurgencies and international terrorism.  Pragmatically, the 
U.S.S.R. used such support as a substitute for conventional warfare.   
As the implements of modern warfare grow evermore expensive and in 
view of the enormous destruction that would accompany a conflict 
involving the major contenders for world power, that is to say the United 
States and the Soviet Union, there has been a marked shift in the postwar 
period on the part of the Soviet Union to the employment of surrogate or 
“proxy” forces to test the resolve of the West and to put pressure on the 
noncommunist world without running the risk of all out war.132   
They also saw insurgency and the tactic of terrorism as a destabilizing weapon to use 
against Western regimes.  Western countries would likely devote more of their budgets to 
internal security, and subsequently redirect the focus of their conventional militaries 
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away from NATO and its role of defending against the U.S.S.R.133  Ideologically; the 
Soviet Union maintained the responsibility to support wars of national liberation.  This is 
expressed specifically in the constitution of 1977 in paragraph 28:  
The foreign policy of the USSR is aimed at ensuring the international 
conditions favorable for building communism in the USSR, safeguarding 
the state interests of the Soviet Union, consolidating the positions of world 
socialism, supporting the struggle peoples for national liberation and 
social progress [italics added by author], preventing wars of aggression, 
achieving universal and complete disarmament, and consistently 
implementing the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different 
social systems.134 
As a method of execution, the Soviets were mostly non-kinetic in their influence.  
However, this is not to say that the Soviets were not heavy handed in their approach to 
“nation building.”  While the United States had to operate within transparent parameters, 
the U.S.S.R. had no such limitations and often times handled insurgency with direct 
conventional application.  Examples ranging from revolutionary suppression in Eastern 
Europe in the early stages of the Cold War, i.e. Czechoslovakia135, to its final 
capitulation in Afghanistan136, the Russian Bear never shied from forceful execution.  
However, outside their empire in Eastern Europe, the Soviets pursued indirect 
engagement in most locations where they opposed the USA and its allies.  As cited 
above, we can see the official stance the Soviets took with their emphasis on fomenting 
insurgency as a means of indirectly affecting the United States.   Few examples of direct 
military involvement against the United States occurred in the skies over Korea, but most 
commonly the U.S.S.R. provided some sort of support to insurgencies battling for control 
against a capitalist, western inspired government.  Soviet FID against western democratic 
powers included aid to Cuba following their revolution, and to North Vietnam.  The 
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U.S.S.R. was not limited to supporting fledgling communist nation states.  To wit, Elad 
and Merari list the different modes of support in creating a terrorist infrastructure to 
include: numerous examples of Soviet backed training programs around the globe; 
testimonies detailing the level and type of armament provided (note simply the 
distribution of the AK-47 and its symbolic representation of wars of liberation); the 
means of logistics and coordination; and distribution of propaganda with overt and covert 
encouragement to the insurgencies in the form of black and white PSYOPs.137   
In essence, the U.S.S.R. executed what amounts to Soviet sponsored FID and 
UW.  From such Soviet action, the U.S. alternative was to combat this non-conventional 
foe on the irregular battlefield, which the U.S. did with success.  Some examples for the 
United States and its application of non-kinetic military and political counteraction to 
Communist expansion include: Greece 1947138; Poland in the 1980’s;  South Vietnam 
and the success over the Vietcong in 1968 through successful programs such as the 
CIDG, the Phoenix Program, the Marine CORDS initiative and other counterinsurgent 
activities; direct support of UW in supplying Mujahadeen Afghan forces with Stinger 
missiles and training in the 1980’s; and support to various Central American irregular 
operations to stem the tide of Communism under the Reagan administration.  While 
conventional Soviet COIN forces proved successful, the same cannot be said for the US 
conventional COIN operations.  When the U.S. used conventional force for non-
conventional conflict, the results are less than optimal because of a reluctance to fully 
crush an insurgent foe and their mechanisms of support.  It is only when the U.S. 
exercises its indirect capabilities that true counteraction vis a vis communist expansion 
was effective.  
It can be surmised then that while ideologically and pragmatically motivated, 
Soviet support to up and coming Communists was primarily fueled by armament, funds, 
and training.  The U.S. did not, as a matter of course, directly intercept shipments of 
weapons, specifically target command and control nodes, launch SOF led direct action 
raids around the globe against guerrilla bases, nor launch multiple High Value Target 
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roundup operations to stem the tide of communist influence (all of which DoD seemingly 
conduct as a matter of priority against a similar adversary today.)  What did occur was an 
indirect engagement on a global level to 1.) Safeguard allied or fledgling governments 
against communist inception, and 2.) Make capitalism a more profitable and appealing 
way of life.  Neither option occurred at the tip of an infantryman’s bayonet nor by simply 
funding that Host Nation government, but by engaging the situation at a local level with 
an understanding of leveraging the appropriate elements of national power required to 
influence the population away from the communist insurgents and towards the legitimate 
government.   Most of the examples above include Foreign Internal Defense operations, 
but as some situations required the opposite engagement, U.S. sponsored Unconventional 
Warfare, to either weaken the occupying communist force or topple the communist 
government, was employed. 
The similarities to the Soviet Union’s use of exported conflict and the rise of 
radical Islamic Insurgency are striking to a point of easy comparison.  While not 
represented by a monolithic empire, like the U.S.S.R., Radical Islam exports its ideology, 
training, funding, and armament much in the same manner…by fueling local insurgencies 
against western allies or interests.  Again, we recognize a lack of any singular Nation 
State backing or sponsoring all radical Islamic Insurgency, but one can note a common 
organizational mechanism, in the form of common ideology in diasporas, and a core of 
non-state actors indirectly fueled by state governance.   
We again summarize the basic concept of exported radical Islam and its war 
against the west.  Either from a national power or from a transnational non-state actor 
both maintains the concept of exporting conservative Islamic ideology and material to 
bring down the power base of western, liberal democracies, in order to solidify their own 
base of power.  While the mechanisms of support remain respective to the levels that can 
be provided from such sources, the extent to which such support towards identified local 
insurgencies or elements of an Islamic population, meets if not bypasses the relative 
affect of similar western backed efforts.  In a paper written for the 2006 ISA Conference, 
Michael Freeman notes emphatically the massive effort to export conservative Wahhabi 
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Islam and Iranian backed Shia revolution since the late 1970’s.139   We can draw similar 
parallels with analysis towards these two such sources. 
The first source is that of the non-state actor.  While al Qaeda found its 
ideological and material roots with the original spread of fundamentalist Islam, this 
global organization has franchised itself to supporting insurgencies at the local level to 
achieve its stated goals.  These goals, in essence rally such support and coalescence at the 
global level.   Primarily then, it is this ideology that is the largest effective export that 
builds and binds fledgling Islamic insurgencies.   
Al Qaeda, or “the Base,” draws its strength from the ties developed during the 
1980’s Afghan War against the Soviets.  Muslims from all over the Middle East, South, 
and South East Asia birthed the first real jihad to protect Islamic interests from infidel 
invasion.140  The call banded together a strongly Wahhabist indoctrinated, well funded, 
and well trained group of zealots.  It is these zealots, who, once returned to their 
homelands, or stayed in Afghanistan to bask in the glory of the Taliban, took up the 
jihadi, separatist cause against their local governments (such as in the Philippines under 
Abu Sayyeff) or continued the struggle against infidels (Bosnia, Chechnya).  The 
proclamations and unification of these local jihadi movements, by the calls from Osama 
bin Laden, effectively solidified the global movement against the west, and western 
supported “Apostate” governments to meet the goals of renewing traditional Muslim 
lands under righteous Sharia law, and reduce the influence of the decadent forces 
currently infecting Moslem populations.  
While al Qaeda originally provided the funding, command and control, and 
training of would-be insurgents as a primary means of spreading their influence, via 
terror tactics against their belligerents, counter-actions since 9/11 have reduced such 
direct support provided by al Qaeda.  That violent act of 9/11 stemmed as a direct result 
of such direct support in planning, funding, training and coordination.  Once noted by the 
United States and her allies, direct engagement effectively curtailed al Qaeda’s 
mechanisms.  However, while bringing attack and scrutiny on their operational 
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capabilities, the attack of 9/11 energized a disenfranchised segment of the Muslim 
population with a strike against the nation that represented to them not only decadent 
influence, but an indirect if not direct oppressor.  Local insurgencies, especially those 
lead by former Mujahadeen were able to capitalize on the concepts and ideology of al 
Qaeda.  It is this franchise concept that ties what could be simply local conflagrations to a 
global struggle. 
Added to the now non-state supported radical Islamic insurgency of al Qaeda is 
the direct support and influence of Nation-State actors.  As mentioned previously, the 
Department of State lists five Nations as state sponsors to terrorism.  Two states 
responsible for the exportation of radical Islam are Iran (Shia) and Saudi Arabia (Sunni).  
Saudi Arabia is not a state sponsor of terrorism, but Iran is officially recognized as a state 
sponsor of terrorism. 
As previously discussed the ideology of the Global Salafi jihad poses a threat, but 
it is not being exported by a state.  Wahhabism is being exported by Saudi Arabia.  
Blanchard reports  
Since its emergence, Wahhabism’s puritanical and iconoclastic 
philosophies have resulted in conflict with other Muslim groups. 
Wahhabism opposes most popular Islamic religious practices such as saint 
veneration, the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday, most core Shiite 
traditions, and some practices associated with the mystical teachings of 
Sufism. In the past, this has brought Wahhabis based in the Arabian 
peninsula and elsewhere into confrontation with non-Wahhabi Sunni 
Muslims, Shiite Muslims, and non-Muslims in neighboring areas.141 
The ties between the ruling Saudi monarchy and Wahhabist religious doctrine 
bind such global influence to state resources.  Events from the 1960’s through the 1980’s 
intensified the Wahhabification of Saudi Arabia to a degree, that when emboldened by 
the funding and influence of oil revenue, exportation and radical conversion in other 
Muslim populations became paramount.  This, done in order to safeguard the monarchy’s 
own legitimacy at home, and to role back the influence of Shia revolutions of the 
1970’s.142  In essence, money and ideology were exported to carry out conservative 
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Muslim doctrine.  As surmised by Freeman, “the result was the exporting on an industrial 
scale of Wahhabi, Salafi, neo-traditionalist or ‘hard’ Islam,” and that, in effect, “in 
Southeast Asia, Saudi and Gulf funds transformed a tolerant, Sufi-style Islam into an 
extremist, ‘hard’ –style of Salafi Islam,”143 giving birth to Osama bin Laden, et al.  
Carried to a logical sequence of events, funding for ideological education amongst a 
population ripe for insurgency, is easily transformed into money for weapons, supplies, 
and training. 
As mentioned, on the Shia side of fundamentalist exportation stands Iran and the 
Islamic revolution. As Sunni support to fundamentalist Islam took the direct form of 
ideology, religious education and indoctrination, and money, the Iranians simply added to 
the capabilities of already established insurgent groups.  This state sponsored 
proliferation of radical, anti-western Islam was, and remains a consistent aspect of Iranian 
foreign policy.  “The 9/11 Commission Report” reveals multiple ties from Iran to al-
Qaeda to Hizballah that alone demonstrates a connection to global insurgent terrorism.144  
The same can be surmised, as done by Geoffrey Gresh writing for The Fletcher School of 
Tufts University, for other ties to practically anywhere there is Islamic Insurgency, as has 
been policy since 1979: 
Its principal themes included a belief in the revolution’s exportability; a 
commitment , at least in the early years of the revolution, to altering the 
nature of the regimes in the Persian Gulf and the regional balance of 
power; a conviction  that certain aspects of Western culture were 
threatening to Iran’s cultural and national identity; a suspicion of Western, 
and particularly American, intentions toward Iran; a revolutionary 
ideology that attached value to a truculent, muscular posture in
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international relations…and a willingness to use unconventional means, 
including assassination and hostage taking, to achieve foreign policy 
ends.145   
Such indirect influence is further elucidated by Iran’s sponsorship and support of 
insurgent terrorist activities in Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Lebanon, and Argentina.146  As such, Iran exemplifies this Islamic Revolutionary 
irregular warfare with such an extensive FID/UW version of their own, and supporting 
infrastructure as reflected by the allocation of moneys to the charitable foundations 
established by Khomeini, and by the activities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
and its Special Forces. 147  Such have been known to establish and sponsor camps within 
Iran and Lebanon, and also in South Africa and the Sudan providing sanctuary, training, 
and weapons. 
In all cases of external support from established nation states – unofficially from 
Saudi Arabia with exported education and ideology as a primary tool of influence, and 
officially from recognized terror sponsors exemplified primarily by Iranian efforts – and 
support by non-state global actors rallying Islamic insurgency to the jihadi cause under 
the al Qaeda banner, the common note that stands obvious but seemingly overlooked by 
U.S. strategists, is the similar operational methods of the United States’ former global 
competitor…the Soviet Union.   
A simple review reveals the parallels of the United States’ actions vis-à-vis those 
of the former Soviet Union, and those that should be taken with the current threat of 
global Islamic Insurgency.  The U.S.S.R. never put a military force in the field to directly 
confront the United States or its allies.  On both sides, the only mechanism of 
engagement was through the indirect means of engagement on the behalf of respective 
interests.  The U.S. effectively engaged communism through the use of non-kinetic                                                  
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military operations, and exercising the influence over the remaining elements of national 
power to affect the target population of local conflicts over separatist, or national 
ideologies.  Predominant military action took place not on the battlefield, but on the 
national, or “improvised” training grounds to help U.S. allied nations defend themselves 
from communist inception, or encourage insurgency against communist regimes.  
Countering Soviet moves on a case by case and country specific scenario allowed other 
non-kinetic engagement strategies to erode the Soviet’s capability to succeed as a global 
belligerent.  Again, note the lack of conventional forces on the field of battle; note the 
emphasis on battling for control over the population with a pushed ideology and violently 
supported insurgent activity at a global scale.  The United States defeated the Soviet 
Union in the Cold War by winning the battle of ideology in contested areas, and by 
forcefully backing allied Host Nations or recognized “freedom fighters,” predominantly 
through indirect means utilizing non-kinetic special operations.  When US conventional 
forces were deployed to affect a non-conventional battle, quagmire and defeat ensued.  A 
re-examination of past success, bearing in mind the force structure and mission emphasis, 
will prove fruitful given current application. 
This concludes our examination of the Cold War and what lessons can be drawn 
from it that are applicable to the situation facing the U.S. today.  In the next chapter we 
will lay out a proposed strategy for the GWOT. 
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IV. NON-CONVENTIONAL INTERDICTION STRATEGY148 
No nuclear weapons have been fired. No massive nuclear retaliation has 
been considered appropriate. This is another type of war, new in its 
intensity, ancient in its origin--war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, 
assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of 
aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead 
of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been 
strangely called "wars of liberation," to undermine the efforts of new and 
poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It 
preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those 
situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges 
that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole 
new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new 
and wholly different kind of military training. 
       --John F. Kennedy149 
This war requires the U.S. military to adopt unconventional and indirect 
approaches…With its allies and partners, the United States must be 
prepared to wage this war in many locations simultaneously and for some 
years to come.150 
Having established the nature of the threat facing the entire globe, and the 
relational ties to the methods of execution during the Cold War, we can now realistically 
apply a framework of operational strategy for the Department of Defense.  Realizing that 
a global security strategy for the United States would naturally include implementation of 
all governmental agencies and their applications toward U.S. elements of national power, 
we also acknowledge the degree to which the DoD will have to synchronize and 
coordinate operational efforts.   
From the quotes beginning this chapter, we reflect upon Kennedy’s prophetic 
vision of protracted future conflict.  True then as it is now, and echoed by the 2006 QDR, 
conflict in the present and in the future will not revolve primarily around the massive 
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engagement of armies in the field, or between an exchange of nuclear armament, but will 
be relegated to the deterrent or preemptive actions of irregular, non-conventional 
engagement.  As we illustrated in the previous chapter, the threat the U.S. faces is a 
transnational network that has ties to other networks and operates much like classic 
insurgencies of the past.  This Non-Conventional Interdiction strategy proposes to 
establish a DoD structure, similar to a network, which would operate around the world 
assisting partner countries to combat insurgencies, punish nation states that support 
insurgencies that use terrorism, and interdict key insurgent leaders.  
In Richard Yarger’s piece Towards A Theory of Strategy:  Art Lykke and the Army 
War College Strategy Model, Yarger presents Art Lykke’s three-legged stool model for 
strategy. 151  The stool model was used in the development of the Non-Conventional 
Interdiction strategy.  Employing Lykke’s model will ensure DoD has a balanced strategy 
that is complementary to the current National Security Strategy.  The Non-Conventional 
Interdiction strategy uses the existing objectives of current strategy, proposes using a new 
concept to meet those objectives, and examines the means to be used. 
A. OJECTIVES (ENDS)  
In order to effectively develop the Non-Conventional Interdiction Strategy the 
objectives out of the following documents were reviewed: the National Security Strategy 
of the United States of America (March 2006), National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism (September 2006), National Defense Strategy (March 2005), and the National 
Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (1 February 2006). The National 
Military Strategy of the United States of America (2004) was reviewed, but its 
overarching objectives were not related to the GWOT.  Any proposed Department of 
Defense strategy must be nested with current U.S. National Strategy.   
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In the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (March 2006) 
the President list the following objectives: 
• Champion aspirations for human dignity. 
• Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks 
against us and our friends. 
• Work with others to defuse regional conflicts. 
• Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
• Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free 
trade. 
• Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the 
infrastructure of democracy. 
• Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global 
power. 
• Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and 
opportunities of the 21st century. 
• Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.152 
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (September 2006) list the following 
short-term objectives: 
• Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of 
terrorism. 
• Prevent attacks by terrorist networks. 
• Deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them. 
• Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states. 
• Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching 
pad for terror.153 
The National Defense Strategy (March 2005) list the following objectives: 
• Secure the United States from direct attack. 
• Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action. 
• Strengthen alliances and partnerships. 
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• Establish favorable security conditions.154 
The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT) dated 1 
February 2006.  The NMSP-WOT list the following objectives: 
• Deny terrorists what they need to operate and survive. 
• Enable partner nations to counter terrorism. 
• Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials and 
increase capacity for consequence management. 
• Defeat terrorists and their organizations. 
• Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other 
U.S. Government agencies and partner nations. 
• Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support 
for terrorism.155 
The Non-Conventional Interdiction Strategy uses the current objectives, but recommends 
a different ways and means to be used to achieve the objectives.    
B. CONCEPTS (WAYS) 
We can better understand this proposed strategy by first analyzing the deterrent 
nature of FID, which will also be then applied as the primary component of the entire 
concept.  Foreign Internal Defense, currently as a matter of U.S. application, is 
committed to countries or regions in which U.S. allies could benefit from the assistance 
of the Untied States in all matters of national power.  As such, when applied to a certain 
country, specific circumstances of that country dictate the type and level of support 
required to assist in safeguarding from internal or external threats.  It is our contention 
that the same analytical process that is used to employ DoD as part of a FID operation at 
a national level can be used to address the security concerns of the U.S. at a global level.  
FID, from this perspective would identify the type and intensity of application.  At the 
national level, in certain countries, when broken down by districts or regions, security 
may be tantamount in one area necessitating direct military action, while economic aid 
and development may be required in another.  Some areas may be controlled by a local 
despot and need to be overthrown; others may simply need a diplomatic intervention by 
                                                 
154 United States Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of 
America, (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2005), iv. 
155 United States Department of Defense, The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on 
Terrorism, 6-7. 
 47 
an assisted representative of the central government.  The same perspective can be 
applied on a global scale, but instead of analyzing the specific requirement of state 
districts within a country, the U.S. would expand its purview so now the whole country 
becomes the focus of the analysis for the type and level of engagement that the U.S. 
would commit to not only help that country protect itself from lawlessness, subversion, 
and insurgency, but also prevent such local conflicts from spilling over, or coalescing 
with other national conflicts, by intervening with U.S. sponsored UW or even Direct 
Engagement (DE) strikes.  
 
Figure 3.   Non-Conventional Interdiction Strategy 
 
The Non-Conventional Interdiction Strategy proposes a DoD structure that will 
use the concepts of Foreign Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare, and Direct 
Engagement.  The DoD structure to implement the FID concept on a global scale would 
consist of four types of nodes and two types of hubs.  The nodes would either be one of 
three action elements or an intelligence element.  The nodes could be used either 
offensively or defensively.  Offensive operations would be proactive or preemptive while 
defensive operations would be in response to a hostile act upon the U.S. 
The action nodes of the network would consist of, three types of non-conventional 
forces, a FID force, a UW force, and a Direct Engagement (DE) force.  These three units 
are the action arms of the strategy.  The CIA could fulfill the role of the intelligence node 
of the structure, but in order to minimize the need for interagency coordination and to 
keep the strategy within DoD the intelligence node would use Josh Walker and Eric 
Deal’s Special Forces Global Counter-Insurgent Network (SFGCIN) concept.156  The 
SFGCIN nodes would collect intelligence and information in particular countries with the 
SFGCIN hubs providing host nation command and control for any FID force assigned to 
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that particular host nation. Regionally the nodes will be networked together through a 
regional headquarters hub and globally through a higher headquarters. There would 
consist of two types of headquarter hubs or supporting arms.  The first headquarters hub 
would provide command, control, and support to the nodes within a region.  This regional 
headquarters hub would act as a bridge between nodes within the region and to other 
nodes within other regional areas.  The second level of headquarters hub would be overall 
responsible for the DoD prioritization and implementation of this strategy and would act 
as a bridge for different regional nodes.  This would allow for direct coordination and 
fusion of information and intelligence.   
This strategy applies Gordon McCormick’s Mystic Diamond framework to attack 
the enemy.  The Mystic Diamond can be employed at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical level.  The terror/insurgent threat is the counter state.  The U.S. will be able to 
simultaneously attack the counter state through all available Mystic Diamond operational 
strategies.  Strategically the U.S. will use operational strategies 3, 4, and 5.  It will attack 
the terror/insurgents directly either with the UW force or the DE force.  Militarily it will 
attack the terror/insurgent’s international support by attacking the safe havens and 
conducting regime change with the UW force or DE force.  Additionally the U.S. will 
extend infrastructure internationally by bolstering friendly nation states with the FID 
force. 
Operationally the FID force will be attempting to extend the infrastructure of a 
friendly nation state to counter the terror/insurgent support base within their countries.  
Additionally the FID force in conjunction with host nation state forces will operate 
indirectly to undermine the terror/insurgent threat’s legitimacy.  As targets of opportunity 
present itself the DE force in conjunction with the host nation can attack the 
terrorist/insurgents directly. 
Operationally when employed the UW force will use operational strategies 1 and 
2.  The UW force can be used to attack the enemy directly or call for the DE force to 
come in and attack the enemy.  
The following sections will discuss each concept in detail.  
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1. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 
An enhanced Foreign Internal Defense (FID) concept, applied as the primary tool 
of U.S. national policy, will serve as an effective deterrent solution to the global 
insurgent threat.  This section justifies such by analyzing the conduct of the United States 
through the framework of its own doctrine and the State/Counter-state dynamic as 
presented by Gordon McCormick.157  It further elucidates the concept with a case study 
of FID and its application.  Today’s world stage requires the U.S. to adopt a more indirect 
role in fighting the GWOT.  Part of the United States DoD strategy must revolve around 
the mitigation of insurgency.  As we have contested, different countries and regions of 
the world foster conditions, either through mismanaged governance or natural 
occurrence, that leaves a segment of their population ripe for insurgency.  It is this local 
problem that the U.S. must address before it reaches global proportions and effectiveness. 
Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign 
Internal Defense (FID) defines FID as: 
Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of 
the action programs taken by another government or other designated 
organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, 
and insurgency.158 
As the definition states FID is more than just the military.  All elements of 
national power need to be applied to adequately support FID.  “The focus of all US 
foreign internal defense (FID) efforts is to support the host nation’s (HN’s) program of 
internal defense and development (IDAD).”159 
In order to understand FID more clearly, the following sections will outline: a) the 
necessary conditions under which it can be applied; b) the need to create a "tipping 
point"; c) how FID can be applied en-lieu of offensive engagement; d) an analysis of FID 
conducted in El Salvador and the Philippines; and e) conclusion. 
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a. Conditions for Application  
“Management of the FID effort begins at the national level, with the 
selection of those nations the US will support through FID programs.  This decision is 
made by the President with advice from the secretary of state, Secretary of Defense, and 
other officials.”160   With that in mind decision makers should target FID programs 
toward nations that can assist in the GWOT.  Joint policy currently dictates three 
conditions that must be met for the U.S. to utilize FID as a means of interaction.  First, 
the country or region in question must ask for assistance; secondly, that country must 
have the internal capability to utilize U.S. assistance; and lastly, support to such a nation 
or region would be the United States’ best interest.161 
Once the decision has been made to implement a FID program military 
decision makers must determine what kind of support is needed. 
Indirect Support.  These operations emphasize the principle of HN self-
sufficiency.  Indirect support focuses on building strong national 
infrastructures through economic and military capabilities that contribute 
to self-sufficiency.  The US military contribution to this type of support is 
derived from security cooperation guidance and provided primarily 
through SA, supplemented by multinational exercises, exchange programs, 
and selected joint exercises. 162 
Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations)….these operations 
involve the use of US forces providing direct assistance to the HN civilian 
populace or military.  They differ from SA in that they are joint- or 
Service-funded, do not usually involve the transfer of arms and equipment, 
and do not usually but may include training local military forces.  Direct 
support operations are normally conducted when the HN has not attained 
self-sufficiency and is faced with social, economic, or military threats 
beyond its capability to handle.   Assistance will normally focus on CMO 
(primarily, the provision of services to the local populace), PSYOP, 
communications and intelligence sharing, and logistic support. In some 
cases, training of the military and the provision of new equipment may be 
warranted.163 
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US Combat Operations.  The introduction of US combat forces into FID 
operations requires a Presidential decision and serves only as a temporary 
solution until HN forces are able to stabilize the situation and provide 
security for the populace.  In all cases, US combat operations support the 
HN IDAD program and remain strategically defensive in nature.  While 
joint and Service doctrine provides specific tactical procedures, there are 
certain principles that should guide employment of US forces in a tactical 
role in support of a FID program.  These principles, and the specific 
command and control (C2) and employment considerations for joint and 
multinational tactical operations in FID, serve as the focus for discussions 
of tactical operations in this publication.164 
When conducting combat operations the U.S. military must follow the principles laid on 
in JP3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense 
(FID) to ensure that host nation legitimacy is maintained.165 
b. Creating a “Tipping Point”:  Insurgency, Counterinsurgency 
and FID 
As defined by US Army doctrine, insurgency is “an organized movement 
aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and 
armed conflict.”166   The current enemy falls under the definition of an insurgency with a 
common anti-western/anti–U.S. ideology and shared tactics on a global scale.  Apart 
from relying on conventional methods of retaliation or preemptive strike, such operations 
against the U.S. call for a different engagement approach in order to either deter would be 
insurgents, or deny attack.   
Using an analogous “Tipping Point”167 metaphor, the United States, 
through solidly applied FID concepts, stabilizes other nations whose balance of influence 
over their population is threatened by insurgency, lawlessness, and subversion.  By 
adding “weight,” through the assistance of the U.S. with that nation’s elements of 
national power, legitimacy of the government is able gain control of the population away 
from those insurgent entities wrestling for the same influence.   
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Control of the Population
Legitimacy of the Government
Influence of the Insurgent
-their ability to operate
Balance is “Tipped”
With the addition of US Sponsored FID
The HN Government needs to past the “Tipping Point.”
 
Figure 4.   FID Tipping Point 
 
FID advisors need to establish measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to gauge 
the effectiveness of the host nation’s IDAD strategy and to determine if the host nation is 
approaching the “tipping point.”  JP 3-07.1 states “MOEs should focus on long-term, 
attainable objectives rather than short-term targets, limited objectives, or over-ambitious 
development goals.”168  When determining MOEs, advisors must be cognizant that the 
MOEs can be misleading i.e., a high body count of guerrillas does not necessarily mean 
the insurgency is on the decline.   
c. Offensive Engagement En-lieu of Conventional Attack: Counter-
Guerrilla Tactics v Counterinsurgent Strategy 
The United States Counterinsurgent (COIN) strategy stems from an over-
arching Foreign Internal Defense (FID) concept.   The United States, in cooperation with 
various nations prone to insurgency, and in its own national interest, seeks to deter such 
terrorist expansion by helping those nations protect themselves.169  COIN is a strategic 
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mechanism of this model. The United States Military, specifically the Army Special 
Forces’, operational efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq revolve around this concept of 
fixing the insurgent problem at the root cause -- the population -- by developing security, 
and the indigenous infrastructure of such, and building upon an environment increasingly 
intolerant to insurgent activity.  Typical operations in both theaters, down to the smallest 
tactical level since 2001, have involved the embedding of U.S. assets into the local 
infrastructure to develop civic and military capabilities.170 These counterinsurgent 
strategic and operational successes amongst the population have bred numerous tactical, 
counter-guerrilla hits.  Highlighted tactical success, unfortunately, has produced an 
ancillary influencing effect of a more tangible “body-count” that directors of Special 
Operations Forces and the conventional generals have latched on to.   
A major factor is a growing perception among special operators that in the 
Pentagon and, increasingly, US Special Operations Command, senior 
leaders are only interested in missions and units that emphasize one set of 
special ops skills – namely, the man-hunting and direct action,  known 
colloquially as “door-kicking”.171  
The irregular forces’ of the Department of Defense, and the State 
Department’s inability to represent to the administration their true raison d'etre in the 
conduct of strategic FID and COIN, and successes on a limited scale therefore reduces 
DoD’s strategic effectiveness in the GWOT and limits the military to the reactive kinetic 
action role as envisioned by Special Operations Command and the conventional military.  
Tactically, the U.S. succeeds at killing terrorists.  But, this is not the statistic that counts 
towards the defeat of the global insurgents as a whole.   
These mostly kinetic, “kill or capture” operations conducted by the 
military in both theaters, belie one of the United States’ truly effective capabilities: that 
is, its ability to shape the globe with U.S. national interests in mind, with non-kinetic 
methods of operation and headed by non-conventional soldier/statesmen.  Far from being 
the nation’s catch-all deterrent solution, this capability, in effect, carries ample credibility 
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and stability to stand as an effective deterrent tactic for the United States.172  Apart from 
the two Middle Eastern theaters, DoD, with the use of Special Forces, lead in COIN 
efforts around the globe especially in Islamic insurgency prone areas of South and South-
east Asia.  Implementation of the Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) concept, in 
conjunction with and outlined by the State Department, fosters other countries’ ability to 
defend itself and further help protect the U.S. and its interests.  It is in these areas where 
the non-kinetic executions of COIN strategy, outside of the scrutiny of higher command 
(such as in the Middle East), shines and has proven successful.  Continuing efforts within 
the Indonesian-Philippine Archipelago, though tactically and rightfully constrained due to 
Host Nation law, have proven extremely fruitful, not by the use of the U.S. Military as 
“door kickers,” but as a Host Nation’s combat multiplier in the FID/COIN role defined 
by doctrine, and employed according to the principles of influencing the population as the 
center of gravity.  The expulsion of Abu-Sayyaff out of Basilan Island, and the continued 
degradation of their influence, proves the success of non-conventional, non-kinetic 
applications.173    Again, however, such indirect success escapes the highlight of the 
Command or the Secretary of Defense, en-lieu of numbers producing kinetic operations.   
In such a conflict, control of the population, that is, influence attained by 
the state or the insurgents over the population, stands as the center of gravity.  Assuming 
that a nation has accepted the cooperation of the U.S., the incumbent authority must first 
provide security to its populace.174  This includes actions from basic law enforcement to 
emergency population control measures.  The state must provide a unified civil/military 
force to first protect the populace and threaten the insurgents’ survival within the 
community, and second, convince individuals not to side with the insurgents by showing 
the state as responsive and competent.175  Tactical measures include food rationing, 
identification, roadblocks, checkpoints, and curfews. These procedures, when employed 
judiciously, segregate the insurgents from their support base either physically or 
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psychologically, reducing the insurgents to the level of criminals.  Such measures, 
however, must be weighed proportionally to what the society can tolerate.  This deterrent 
action must be stable, in that such action will not escalate the situation or prompt 
blowback.176   
The Department of Defense, in conjunction with the efforts of the State 
Department, has the capacity with SF to strategically implement such cooperation, but 
does not focus or apply such towards this delicate mission.  Instead, the lead of U.S. 
military efforts in the GWOT, while figuratively given to non-conventional units, is 
retained by conventional and hyper-conventional forces with a direct action mindset.  
Violent and heavy handed counter-guerrilla action, executed by a conventional force, 
typically negates the strides gained by non-kinetic civil-military operations. The limited 
tactical success, loved so much by a tangible-results-oriented army, and fueled by 
impatient public, breeds only a desire for more of that capability.  
d. The Mystic Diamond and Successful Cases of Application 
(1) FID Historical Analysis:  El Salvador.  When we look at 
using an expanded Foreign Internal Defense program to meet the goal of defeating global 
terrorism, we need to have an idea if it is going to work.  The best way of evaluating if 
FID can work is to look to history and find a case study where it helped to defeat an 
insurgency.  U.S. involvement in El Salvador provides a possible example.   
In El Salvador from 1980 until 1992, a small group of American 
military advisors helped to defeat a committed insurgency.  Limited by congress to a cap 
of only 55 training personnel, the American FID mission helped to shape the El 
Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) into a credible force.177 
When the American mission began, the ESAF was a force of only 
9,000 incapable of flexible maneuver, largely tied to static defense missions, and 
vulnerable to defeat by the rebels.178  The combination of U.S. military aide and this 
small advisory team allowed the ESAF to grow to a force of over 40,000.  The improved 
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capability of the ESAF first convinced the guerillas that they (1) could not defeat the 
ESAF (2) faced possible defeat by the ESAF (3) needed to accept negotiations.179 
Analyzing El Salvador as a case study on FID, two major points 
must be made.  First, the combination of American advisors and military aide proved 
particularly effective.  Advisors were able to ensure that military aide was correctly used 
and the importance of that aide put great pressure on the ESAF to listen to the 
advisors.180  Second, the advisors were credited by several reports, including a United 
Nations report with improving the combat effectiveness, human rights performance, 
constitutional respect, and democratic values in El Salvadoran Armed Forces.181  
El Salvador provides an example of how a small group of advisors 
on a FID mission can help to change the course of an insurgency. An individual, regional 
specific assessment of that country’s situation illuminated the requirement for military 
assistance against a growing insurgent threat. We can see by way of comparison that the 
El Salvador’s governance, with assistance from the United States correctly identified the 
operational strategy (reference McCormick’s Diamond Model) to employ.  Providing a 
baseline of nation security as a priority, and then attritting the insurgent after having 
removed the support or ambivalence of the population, the emboldened military force 
defeated the threat.  For the U.S., specifically at this time when President Reagan re-
engaged the Cold War with increased spending and clandestine operations via irregular 
forces, El Salvador marked a containment success against communist expansion.   By 
keeping a low profile, this mission was sustainable over the long term and ultimately 
successful. 
(2) FID Historical Analysis:  Basilan Island.  The United States 
and Philippine COIN operations of 2003, labeled BALIKATAN, stand as what has 
become the model of the Mystic Diamond in application…to the point of being coined 
the “Basilan Model.”182   
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The attacks of 9/11 prompted the U.S. to extend action to wherever 
al Qaeda was to be linked or found.  The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF), and Jemmaah Islamiyya (all AQ linked) found operational and 
supportive refuge in the southern Philippines, and at the same time were holding U.S. 
citizens hostage, putting the region in the crosshairs of US response to “terrorism.”183   
In conjunction with the State Department and the Philippine 
government, the DoD planned a joint COIN campaign to be executed as part of FID 
assistance to the region.  In this case, it was determined that security need be reinstated 
and focused on the development of the ASG island stronghold on Basilan.184  Specific 
requirements to the needs of the population were further determined by United States 
Special Forces advisors to the region in order to refine a phased strategy of employment.   
The team[s] conducted detailed area assessments down to the village level 
and updated them throughout the operation.  They gathered vital 
information about the enemy situation, army training requirements, local 
demographics, infrastructure, and socioeconomic conditions.185 
The enhanced capabilities of Special Forces’ efforts added to an in-depth understanding 
of the situation and tempered military employment to effective ends.  Specifically, COL 
Gregory Wilson, then one of the advisors and planners, further elucidates the principles 
of the Diamond Model as applied to Basilan, to pursue three operational strategies: 
• Building Philippine Armed Forces capacity in order to create security on the 
island. 
• Focused civil-military operations to improve the quality of life for the 
citizens. 
• Information Operations aiming to enhance governmental legitimacy.186  
• Again, the center of gravity for operations against the insurgents flows 
indirectly through the engagement of the population.  By securing the 
population and setting the conditions to establish a responsive, legitimate 
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governmental presence, this FID operation all but eliminated the ASG 
presence in the region. 
Further reflection of both planners and operators within the 
American and Philippine forces note the success of this ongoing effort.  One Philippine 
officer reported, 
Where once the people supported rebels and extremists because they felt 
neglected or oppressed by the government, the delivery of their basic 
needs … construction of infrastructure… and strengthening security in the 
community that the Balikatan program brought [sic] changed their 
attitudes and loyalty.  As residents began to experience better living 
conditions, they withdrew support from the militants.187  
This is successful FID in action.  With the application of the “Mystic Diamond” Model to 
the specific situation as identified by properly trained and educated soldier/diplomats, the 
legitimate host nation forces quelled an ongoing and rising insurgent problem in their 
own backyard, while at the same time, the United States reduced the global insurgent 
problem by emphasizing and confronting a local insurgency with ties to U.S. national 
security interests.  The correct focus of application, in this case, almost stems as a result 
of a lack of higher oversight (focused on the “Main Effort” in Afghanistan) and 
scrutinization from a disinterested public.  It can be theorized that the minimal footprint 
of the SOF forces, and public attention on the Middle East and South Asia freed the 
strategists and operators to temper operations to the recognized problem set…a local 
insurgency to be defeated not by overt U.S. direct action, but a skilful, holistic application 
of indirect COIN methods inspired by the Mystic Diamond Model. 
e. Conclusion: US Involvement and Legitimacy 
Foreign Internal Defense can act as a great force multiplier.  Faced with a 
limited budget and limited forces and a truly global war, a conventional execution is not 
the answer.  Developing and using an expanded FID capability will allow the U.S. to 
maintain the long-term, low intensity involvement that is needed to prevail in the GWOT. 
Far from acting as the world’s SWAT team, the U.S. Military, in 
cooperation with the Host Nation’s civil and military forces and the State Department, 
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has denied the insurgents freedom of maneuver within a limited global population, as 
evident from operational success in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines.188  The 
United States Special Forces works to bolster a nation’s capabilities to act unilaterally in 
safeguarding itself from lawlessness, subversion and further insurgency.  The transition 
of authority and capability from the U.S. to the now developed and competent Host 
Nation deters the insurgent from rallying the so called oppressed against a supposedly 
incompetent regime.  This indirect approach denies the insurgent freedom of maneuver 
and threatens his existence. 
Such non-kinetic acts for control of the population, implemented by an 
IDAD concept, also enable a host nation government’s engagement strategy to actively 
confront the insurgents.189  Trusted by the population, the state works its own intelligence 
collection apparatus into the insurgent infrastructure attempting to operate amongst the 
people.  By the development of local paramilitary or security organizations, the state puts 
the responsibility of livelihood on the shoulders of the local community. That 
community, united in its own self-interest, rejects insurgent incursions by policing their 
own, or providing actionable intelligence to the state forces.  The state forces are then 
able to directly apply kinetic action against the insurgents.  As the insurgents’ capabilities 
dwindle from inactivity or attrition, or the insurgents themselves realize the futility of 
their actions, incentive programs, such as amnesty, bring once or would be insurgents 
back to society.   
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United States FID/COIN strategy is therefore a multi-operational approach 
to deterring and defeating insurgency.191  Applied specifically to a single nation and their 
difficulties in self-preservation, or broadly against a Global Insurgent, the concept of 
deterring the insurgent by denying them the population with an application of the IDAD 
(bolstering that nation’s diplomatic, informational, military and economic capabilities,) 
and destroying the insurgent infrastructure both directly and indirectly, stands as a 
credible and stable alternative to conventional, reactive confrontation.   
2. Unconventional Warfare (UW) 
This section will present an alternative solution to coerce a nation state that 
supports or foments terrorism.  Rather than simply relying on a conventional invasion and 
subsequent occupation using all the might and power of the United States military, this 
primary offensive method will be through the application of U.S. sponsored UW.   
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Robert F. Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva recognize that what they call 
international terrorism can be deterred, both specifically with punishment over terrorist 
acts and by denying the terrorists freedom to attack or maneuver.192  Yes, this threat can 
be effectively deterred with what is already in the United States’ arsenal, but only after 
positively defining the nature of the entire threat and recognizing the inherent capabilities 
within the U.S. government.  Even a cursory analysis of the threat would justly steer the 
use of military power in the direction of non-conventional or irregular means of 
interdiction.  Our thesis has argued part of the solution to be a preemptory engagement 
strategy led by a strong commitment to FID.  This is but one third, albeit the emphasized 
portion of the strategic equation.  The second emphasis of this proactive/reactive 
combination strategy is the offensive component aligned under deterrence through 
punishment.  Still being primarily irregular, the United States can effectively employ or 
set the conditions for punitive regime change in support of National Security objectives 
with the use of units specifically geared for UW.   
Unfortunately, UW is a misunderstood term with varying definitions.  The 
definition of UW has gone through many metamorphoses through the ages.  Currently 
Joint Publication 1-02 and Joint Publication 3-05 define UW as: 
A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of 
long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or 
surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and 
directed in varying degrees by an external source.  It includes, but is not 
limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, 
and unconventional assisted recovery.193 
FM 1-02 and FM 3-05.201 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations, 
definition is similar, but differs in “conducted through, with, or by indigenous” versus 
“conducted by indigenous.”  The second sentence also differs, the joint publication 
allows for a broader interpretation of what activities fall under UW.  FM 3-05.201 defines 
UW as: 
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A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of 
long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces 
who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying 
degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct 
offensive, low visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as the 
indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and 
evasion and escape.194  
Though recently contested in definition, these UW operations are best 
summarized and described by LTC Mark Grdovic as:  
…activities conducted by the US government to support insurgencies 
conducting operations to disrupt or defeat a hostile government or 
occupying power in accordance with US strategic goals.195 
This is further elucidated by the most recent Army manual stating:  
The intent of US Unconventional Warfare operations is to exploit a hostile 
power’s political, military, economic and psychological vulnerabilities by 
developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish US strategic 
goals.196 
Unconventional Warfare addresses the concerns of policy makers and their need 
for action, but keeps the U.S. signature of such action at a minimum for the longest time 
possible resulting in sound international strategy, offering domestic political benefits by 
limiting U.S. force deployment, and providing tactical advantage for the introduction of 
more kinetic means of application.   
Decision makers must also, however, realize that just as the Joint Publication 
states, UW is of long duration.  Quick results are more than likely not going to be 
forthcoming, and decision makers should be committed to the prolonged engagement.  
The United States’ recent successes in UW have bred a misunderstanding of utilization.  
The Department of Defense and the Department of State have recognized the utility of 
this operational strategy, but are currently hampered by the quickly gratifying results of 
optimal U.S. sponsored insurgent conditions such as the case of UW efforts in Operation 
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Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).197  Such operations of this 
sort additionally belie other strategic uses of UW other than simply preparing for 
conventional invasion.  In essence, the U.S. has been and continues to be limited by its 
very recent successes.   
In order to understand UW more clearly, the following sections will outline: a) the 
necessary conditions under which it can be applied; b) the need to create a "tipping 
point"; c) how UW can be applied en-lieu of conventional attack; d) an analysis of UW 
conducted in World War II; and e) conclusion. 
a. Conditions for Application 
U.S. sponsored Unconventional Warfare addresses specifically the 
relationship of state-sponsored terrorism against the United States and DoD reaction to 
such.  Not all situations may present obvious non-kinetic options, but all will be similar 
in that all nations or regional non-state power structures operate through the employment 
of elements of national power.  Fractures between the enemy government and its 
population can be exploited.    Considering the nature of support to any particular regime, 
and the fractures identified within the enemy national infrastructure, UW targets the will 
of that population, not to be eroded as in most historical cases, but bolstered in opposition 
to a government exporting terror in their name.198  By either setting the conditions for a 
more forceful regime change with conventional forces and campaigns, or enhancing the 
chances of change from within, the sponsorship of insurgency gives the U.S. a valid, 
legitimate option for punitive action. 
There are two main conditions that must be met prior to implementing a 
UW campaign.  First and foremost the nation state must pose a threat to the United States 
by supporting and fomenting terrorism.  As previously identified, such state support can 
be either officially sanctioned by that country’s national government i.e., Iran, or 
unofficially sanctioned by the ruling powers of that population i.e., a competing 
governance, Saudi Arabia.  The second condition that must be present is there has to be
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some type of internal resistance or opposition for U.S. forces to work with.  “Before the 
conduct of SF UW operations, a resistance potential should exist.  SF personnel do not 
create this resistance potential”.199 
The first condition may seem pretty clear cut, but prior to ordering the 
initiation of a UW campaign, decision makers must ensure that it is in America’s best 
interest to attack that country at the present time.  Conducting regime change might have 
second and third order effects that will create a bigger problem.  Instead, decision makers 
might want to look at containing the offending nation state through the manipulation of 
other elements of national power. 
Once decision makers have determined how they are going to apply UW, 
they must determine the U.S. commitment level.  The U.S. can look at three levels of 
commitment to UW.  Derek Jones, in discussions with Mark Grdovic, proposes adding to 
the definition of UW by adding three types of support which would correlate to the level 
of commitment: indirect support, direct support, and direct support involving combat 
operations.200  
• Indirect support-provide logistical support to insurgent forces.  This indirect 
support could be through directly providing arms, ammunition, and equipment 
or selling the above mentioned items to insurgent forces.  This type of support 
can also include political and morale support to the insurgent forces. 
• Direct support-provide logistical support, training, and intelligence support 
to insurgent forces as well as U.S. advisors. 
• Direct support involving combat operations-this would involve the 
insertion of USSF to conduct operations by, with, and through insurgents 
against the hostile central government.  This support would also include U.S. 
aircraft to provide close air support as needed.  
In addition to ensuring the appropriate conditions are set for U.S. 
sponsored UW, decision makers and leaders must ensure that the principles of UW, as 
put forth by Steven P. Basilici and Jeremy Simmons in Transformation: A Bold Case for 
Unconventional Warfare, are followed.  The principles are as follows: 
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• The Principle of Overlapping Objectives—US Military objectives must 
overlap with the indigenous force’s political objectives. If military and 
political objectives are incongruent, there will be extreme difficulties in 
achieving the military objectives the US is seeking to accomplish.  
• The Principle of Decontrol—This principle preempts UW efforts from 
becoming “bureaucratically compromised.” Effective decision-making must 
be predicated on local conditions. Secondly, UW operators working with 
indigenous forces must be able to make snap decisions when required. 
Excessive command and control is a hindrance on UW operations. 
• The Principle of Restraint—UW operations are characterized by the discreet 
application of firepower. This may imply greater individual risk on the part of 
the UW operators but the benefits far outweigh the costs.  
• The Principle of Perseverance—This principle is best understood in the 
context that UW operations take time to develop.  
• The Principle of Fostering Legitimacy—Perhaps the most important 
principle. UW operations with legitimacy have a better chance for long-term 
success. Legitimacy can be built over time but sacrificing legitimacy for 
expediency should not be done without careful consideration.201 
b. Creating a “Tipping Point” 
In creating the “tipping point” U.S. forces in conjunction with the 
insurgent forces are attempting to sway the influence of the host nation population.  
Charles Burton Marshall states, “Battle is only one aspect of the competition between 
government and challenger” and “The affection or disaffection of the local society thus is 
a decisive factor in the outcome of the armed aspects of the struggle”.202  The legitimacy 
of the government must be decreased while the insurgency’s legitimacy must be 
increased.  The support of the populace is critical for the toppling of regime.  
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The UW campaign commander must have some way to measure the 
effectiveness of the UW campaign; the commander needs to know when he is 
approaching the “tipping point”.  Steven P. Basilici and Jeremy Simmons offer seven 
tactical [operational] and two strategic measures of effectiveness that a commander can 
use. 
 Tactical [Operational] 
• Desertion rates. 
• Morale. 
• Recruiting. 
• Number of guerrilla/terrorist incidents. 
• Counter-guerrilla reporting from the population. 
• Increased indiscriminate government violence. 
• Redeployment of military/police assets. 
Strategic 
• Increased international recognition of insurgents. 
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• Decrease international support for government.203 
With appropriate measures of effectiveness commanders at the various levels can modify 
tactics to achieve the “tipping point”. 
c. Offensive Engagement En-lieu of Conventional Attack 
A conventional attack requires a large footprint of U.S. forces and 
equipment.  This footprint has a large impact on not only the national population, but also 
the global population.  The invasion of Iraq required a disproportionately larger number 
of troops and their equipment to topple Saddam Hussein.  The invasion of Afghanistan 
was accomplished with a handful of SF A-teams working in conjunction with Anti-
Taliban forces, and U.S. close air support that toppled the Taliban government.   A 
smaller offensive footprint is more palatable for the U.S. public to swallow.  
US sponsored insurgency, or the execution of UW, has to maintain 
legitimacy in the conduct of its actions.  The “means must justify the ends” in this case.  
As such SF, working in conjunction with the insurgents against an enemy regime, must 
concentrate on legitimate targets.  Having the backing of the U.S., through all levels of 
support, negates the need to resort to a tactic of a weak position… terrorism.  In as much, 
a low U.S. signature, coupled with a successful, legitimate new government (born of the 
guerrilla battlefield) fosters effective leadership to the population and represents validity 
to the international communities… not to mention adding a new friend to the list of U.S. 
Allies.  While not all situations may be suitable for the sole use of UW as a means of 
interdiction, most instances will present opportunities for exploitation by indirect means.  
Just as COIN operations would primarily target control of the population away from the 
insurgent, so too would the opposite be true with UW.   The U.S. sponsored insurgents 
would wrestle control of the population away from the government by employing all 
levels of tactical operations short of terrorism to gain this support.  These operations 
include aggressive propaganda, guerrilla warfare, subversion, and sabotage. 
U.S. sponsored UW can be applied two ways.  First, the U.S. can provide 
support to the revolutionary/opposition force.  Secondly, the U.S. can commit U.S. forces 
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to support the resistance/opposition force with the intent of establishing conditions for the 
introduction of conventional forces.204 
The distinction between the two will affect not only the amount of risk 
U.S. UW forces will take, but also the targets attacked.  In the first case of application, 
resistance forces can target any infrastructure that will harass, interdict, or delegitimize 
the enemy government, short of specifically targeting civilians for the purpose of 
coercion through terror…that is “terrorism.”  In the second case some targets (such as 
certain infrastructure) might not be targeted because the destruction would harm the 
livelihood of the population, or otherwise hinder the advancement of conventional forces. 
By specifically identifying elements of national power that are most 
susceptible to attack, the U.S. sponsored insurgents can set the conditions for revolution 
by judiciously employing appropriate levels of support.  Not all insurgencies would sub 
sequentially require an SF led guerrilla force to do the job.  Just as in FID, certain levels 
of support would enhance the overall perception and acceptance of either the irregular 
fighting force preparing for allied invasion, or the new government in place after the 
overthrow of the oppressors. 
d. The Mystic Diamond and Successful Case of Application 
Examples of DoD, that is the U.S. Army run, Unconventional Warfare 
operations are few and far between, and relatively unseen in the larger context of military 
history.  In and of itself, this facet strengthens the argument for employment.  In most 
cases UW was primarily used to set the conditions for an eventual invasion of 
conventional forces.  Recent hallmark operations of Afghanistan OEF 2001 and Northern 
Iraq in the beginning phases of OIF in 2003, have re-established the standard of U.S. 
Army UW application.   
But, perhaps the best example of effective operational and strategic UW is 
the ground breaking structure and efforts of the clandestine U.S. and British units of 
World War II, specifically in the European theater, representing the helicon days of 
special operations when the Office of Strategic Services had not yet split into the CIA 
and modern U.S. Special Forces.   Not simply operational in nature, the UW efforts prior 
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to D-Day not only helped to establish favorable conditions for the following landing 
forces, but also strategically helped strengthen the resolve and capabilities of a nation 
under occupation.  In this case of offensive indirect action, the primary operational 
strategy to effect the degradation and eventual defeat of the state in this case is first OS 1 
targeting primarily the will and support of the population, and then OS 2, attacking the 
German’s methods of control over the French (through their military occupation forces.)  
Does this example stretch back to the inception of U.S. Unconventional Warfare?  Yes.  
Is this a dated example?  No.  This unit and situation perfectly exemplified DoD’s 
inherent capability that it at one time wielded with ingenuity and effectiveness.  Some 
may even argue for a return to this structure and capability.  A brief review of this lends 
understanding of where the United States needs to go in terms of support to insurgency to 
carry out strategic objectives. 
While Germany occupied most of the European continent, the staff of 
SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces) planned a cross-channel 
invasion into France to alleviate their Russian ally, and set-off the demise of the Third 
Reich.  To divert enemy forces, cause confusion, and generally thwart the Germans' 
response to the attack, the command of Special Forces Headquarters decided to insert 
operational groups to train and organize the French resistance, who waged a guerilla war 
since 1940.  The Jedburghs was one such group inserted deep into enemy territory to 
complete this dangerous mission.  
This unit stands as one of the most successful special operations groups to 
be used in World War II.  Their accomplishments struck the occupying Germans' interior 
lines, and raised the spirits of those oppressed.  The Jedburghs represented a contact for 
the partisans and the allied forces that would soon liberate them. 
Recruits were selected from all branches of service in a call for those 
volunteering for hazardous duty.  SFHQ decided that both the OSS and SOE would field 
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a total of 100, three-man teams.205 Each team would optimally consist of one Frenchman, 
one Englishman, and an American (with a few Belgians included); two officers and one 
sergeant radio operator.206 
Because of this unique task, men were sought who had certain qualities 
enhancing their ability to cope with the strenuous and dangerous nature of the mission.  
Those recruited were "picked for qualities of leadership and daring, [the] ability to speak 
French, and all around physical condition."  Plus, they had to "have the ability to 
parachute behind enemy lines. . . be experienced in handling men. . . and have an aptitude 
for small arms."  By the beginning of February 1943, more than 300 potential 
commandos answered the call.207 
The training center for the newly created group was an old Elizabethan 
mansion, called Milton Hall, at Jedburgh in northeast England; hence the operational 
codename -- JEDBURGH.  Those commandos involved became known as Jedburghs or 
Jeds.208  Established by Lieutenant Colonel Frank V. Spooner of the British Army (SOE), 
the Jeds trained in all forms of commando-type operations and in the skills needed for 
their specific mission.  These skills included "demolitions, foreign weapons training, [day 
and] night navigation, agent circuit operations, intelligence, sabotage, escape and 
evasion, counterespionage, ambushes, security, the use of couriers [and dead drops], and 
hand-to-hand combat."209  In addition, they had to be proficient in French, the use of 
Morse code, and operate the "suitcase" British B Mark II radio specially designed for 
them.210 
The Americans, before coming to Milton Hall, had to undergo 
psychological examinations, study SOE communications, practice marksmanship and 
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self-defense, and attend the British Ringway (three-day) Jump school where they learned 
to exit RAF bombers from "Joe-holes."211 This additional training and education was 
intended to bring the U.S. servicemen up to the SAS commando standards before 
launching into Jedburgh.  By the end of their Milton Hall stay, Major William Colby (a 
Jedburgh himself and future director of the U.S. CIA) stated that these soldiers "were 
honed to the sharpest edge humanly possible."212 
By May, 1944, the Jeds were fully prepared to deploy.  In that same 
month, the initial teams were sent to North Africa, later to parachute into southern 
France.213  The rest were inserted over the duration of the summer to total 93 teams in 
country by September with seven teams in Holland.214  Amazingly, the Jeds suffered 
only 21 casualties, all but two (initial parachute injuries) incurred in action.  No one was 
ever captured.215 
As a rule, the Jeds wore uniforms of their nationality and prepared no 
cover story to avoid being shot as spies.  The uniform also augmented their authority and 
gave the Maquis a sense of working directly in conjunction with the allied forces.216  If 
captured, they gave name, rank, and serial number, claiming the provisions due to them 
according to military law.217  Their mission was not to infiltrate the Germans themselves, 
but to organize resistance in response to the impending invasion.  With this in mind, the 
efficiency of this elite unit can be analyzed by noting their success during Operation 
Overlord and the subsequent breakout. The Jeds did not assume command functions 
within the Maquis; they simply helped plan and conduct sabotage operations on 
communication installations, fuel and ammunition depots, and attack enemy pockets of 
resistance cut off by the advancing Allies.218  At the same time, the Jeds were to provide 
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intelligence and an immediate link from local units to SHAEF's headquarters.219  This 
communications link especially helped SHAEF to best utilize the Maquis.  Once overrun 
by the allies, the remaining Jeds would assume a liaison's role by coordinating with locals 
to reestablish the civil administration out of German occupation and arrange partisan 
assistance in guarding important installations.220 
The Jedburghs, in total, armed and organized over 20,000 guerillas.  These 
forces managed to cut important railways, immobilize trains, and destroy engines, thus 
effectively slowing rail traffic on the Cherbourg Peninsula.221  "As a consequence of this 
Maquis activity, a major part of the German forces in Brittany was diverted to fighting 
resistance groups."222  Included also in this sabotage was the destruction of power 
stations and telecommunication lines making re-supply and command of German units 
difficult.223 
Overall, the Jedburghs maintained noteworthy success during the D-Day 
invasion and in the months that followed.  Because of the absolute professionalism and 
expertise of the soldiers involved in the program, the French resistance was able to strike 
an appreciable blow against its four year oppressors.  The Jeds and their counterparts 
fought with extreme valor and bravado following the principles of guerrilla warfare -- 
"'Surprise, mitraillage, evanouissement', as the French called it; surprise, kill, vanish."224  
Out of the 82 American Jedburghs, 53 received the Distinguished Service Cross, Croix de 
Guerre, Legion of Merit, Silver or Bronze Star, or Purple Cross, thus claiming the highest 
percentage of citations during the entire war for a single unit.225   
It is easy to establish the Jedburghs as an elite unit by simply comparing 
the unit's selection process, training, standards, esprit d' corps, and utility born out of 
crisis.  No other unit could have accomplished this type of mission with the amount of 
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success the Jeds enjoyed.  Theirs is a perfect example of an elite force of World War II 
and is even comparable to the Special Forces of today. 
This aspect of mission focused task selection, specific personnel 
recruitment, emphasis on legitimizing the insurgent forces, and further fostered and 
enhanced by the extensive interdepartmental training and experience driven intuition of 
the operators themselves, was the key factor for tactical success - punctuated by direct 
and tangible actions against German lines of communications - and a strategic success - 
the psychological effect on French population in seeing their oppressor weakened by their 
French kinsmen.   But, it especially enhanced operational success – actions in 
anticipation of D-Day, on June 6th, and afterward in order to facilitate the introduction of 
Allied ground forces into mainland Europe and the subsequent liberation of France.  
Overall success, based on the conduct of the organization, remains high in terms of 
output and effect.  In this case, the environmental situation, engaged by the organization, 
produced tactical and operational success, and had positive strategic implications that 
lasted to the end of the war.  The overall outcome was positive and stands as such in the 
eyes of history. 
e. Conclusion:  The Means Justify the Ends 
In the case of such a state sponsored terrorist threat, Unconventional 
Warfare stands as a viable offensive solution to at least part of the Global Terror problem.  
By judicially employing the capabilities of indigenous or surrogate insurgent forces, with 
strict adherence to the concept effecting change in the state, or setting the conditions for 
follow-on action by legitimately influencing the population as a primary means, and 
attacking the established infrastructure as a supporting effort, the United States can wield 
an effective yet low cost weapon of global influence.   In essence, the U.S. would foment 
certain insurgencies to defeat Global Insurgency propagated by a states that use terrorism 
against the U.S. and its interests.   
Keeping in mind the three afore mentioned levels of support to an 
insurgency, this United States Unconventional Warfare strategy stands as a multi-
operational approach to deterring and defeating international insurgency against civilized 
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and legitimate governments, and thusly against “Global Terrorism.”226  Against a Nation-
State exporting terrorists as a means of directly attacking the U.S., this concept can serve 
as a deterrent punishment for instigating insurgency abroad.  Instead of FID in this 
circumstance, a more offensive Unconventional Warfare campaign or simply a 
conventional attack fits the analogy of fighting “Global Insurgents” by attacking a known 
base of operations, as the U.S. did in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Such a determination of the 
source of the terrorist threat, and its unique attributes would steer either a 
punishment/offensive, or a preemptory/defensive deterrent campaign.   
3. Direct Engagement (DE) 
Direct engagement is the last prong and a last resort in the Non-conventional 
interdiction strategy.  Direct engagement can consist of surgical air strikes, direct action 
raids, or conventional force operations.  DE can be unilateral or combined operations. 
a. Conditions for Application 
There are three instances when DE should be used.  First a time sensitive 
target of opportunity presents itself and it is in the best interest of the U.S. to take action 
i.e., the AC-130 strikes in Somalia.  The second instance is, there is a need to punish a 
nation state, but the conditions for UW are nonexistent.  Punishment can come in the 
form of raids and strikes on infrastructure or regime change.  Lastly DE can be used as 
part of coercive diplomacy, but the effects desired need to be specific. 
b. Creating a “Tipping Point” 
Unlike FID and UW operations DE is not contingent upon gaining the 
support of the population.  The population should be considered in the conduct of any 
operation.  The U.S. does not want to create a greater problem than it had prior to 
operations.  Popular support is critical during reconstruction efforts, therefore decision 
makers must think about the ultimate end-state prior to conducting regime change.  When 
DE is used as part of coercive diplomacy decision makers can use the “tipping point” 
concept to determine how much force needs to be applied to achieve the desired effect. 
c. Considerations Prior to Authorizing Direct Engagement 
Prior to the authorization of DE decision makers must determine what the 
task and purpose is as well as the desired end-state of the DE.  In addition the number of 
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troops needed not only for the operation, but for SSTR operations if needed and the long-
term effects on GWOT and U.S. foreign policy.  In 1995 the U.S. committed to Operation 
Joint Endeavor, a one year [emphasis added] operation in Bosnia to separate the warring 
factions.  U.S. forces were to be a part of the Implementation Force (IFOR).  IFOR 
transitioned to SFOR in December 1996.  On 2 December 2004 the SFOR mission was 
terminated, nine years since the initial deployment.227  The Bosnia mission was 
terminated sometime between 2003 and 2005.228  The task, purpose, and ultimate end-
state will help planners adequately forecast the necessary troop strength.  As Operation 
Iraqi Freedom demonstrated the number of troops needed to defeat the Iraqi Army and 
topple Saddam Hussein were far less then required to actually secure Iraq and set the 
conditions for SSTR operations.  
d. The Mystic Diamond and Successful Case of Application 
DE is primarily used to attack a nation state or group of people directly.  It 







Gain influence on existing 
government 1 2  
Punish existing government 
with intent to gain a 
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1 2  
Punish existing government  1 2 
Regime Change   1 
Figure 7.    Examples of Desired Effects and suggested means of achievement 
 
The U.S. has had successful conventional operations over the years.  The 
2003 invasion of Iraq is the most recent example of conducting regime change.  The 
invasion primarily used OS 3, 4, and 5.  Using OS 3 the U.S. attacked Iraq directly and 
topple the Iraqi government in short order.  The U.S. attempted to use OS 4 to isolate Iraq 
internationally and was able to do so for the most part.  The U.S. used OS 5 to extend to 
                                                 
227 “Operation Joint Forge,” GlobalSecurity.org, 27 April 2005 [Website]; available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/joint_forge.htm; accessed 16 April 2007. 
228 Congressional Budget Officer, “An Analysis of the U.S. Military’s Ability to Sustain an 
Occupation in Iraq:  An Update,” 5. 
 76 
get international support for the invasion of Iraq.  The U.S. had limited success gaining 
international support.  Although the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government was 
successful, the SSTR efforts are abysmal.  Iraq is an example of a desired end state that 
was unclear and military leaders were not prepared for. 
An unsuccessful example of DE was the U.S. response to the 1998 
embassy bombings.  After the bombing of the US Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 
1998 the United States used OS 3 to attack al Qaeda’s directly.  The strikes attacked bin 
Laden’s terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan.  
The U.S. attacks in Afghanistan “had killed 20-30 in the camps but probably missed Bin 
Laden by a few hours.”229  The use of DE in this case was an abysmal failure and 
achieved no apparent effect. 
C. REOURCES (MEANS) 
Yarger states that means “explain what specific resources are to be used in 
applying the concepts to accomplish the objectives and use no verb. Means can be 
tangible or intangible.”230  The NMSP-GWOT states “the combination of the Combatant 
Commands, the Military Departments, the Combat Support Agencies, and the programs 
and resources of the Department of Defense constitute the military means for fighting the 
GWOT.”231  That is a general statement. 
When determining the means, decision makers should conduct an analysis of who 
is best suited to execute the ways in order to achieve the ends.  By examining each node 
of the proposed DoD structure and the intended purpose we can determine who is best 
suited. 
1. Foreign Internal Defense 
The FID force will conduct FID operations in friendly host nations.  Any DoD 
unit should be able to conduct FID operations with additional training, but only SOF, 
Special Forces in particular, have FID as a core mission.  JP 3-05 states 
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SOF are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to accomplish nine 
core tasks: direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, 
unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, psychological operations 
(PSYOP), civil affair operations, counterproliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and information operations.232 
Additionally JP 3-07.1 states “FID programs often require small US elements to deploy 
in isolated areas to support threatened HN governments.”233  Special Forces soldiers are 
trained to operate in small teams in ambiguous environments.  JP 3-07.1 further states 
Training to prepare for military operations to support FID requires that a 
broad range of areas be covered.  The training also must be designed to 
support a mix of personnel, ranging from language-trained and culturally 
focused SOF to those totally untrained in the specific area where the FID 
program is located. 
SOF, primarily US Army special forces, PSYOP, and CA, receive 
extensive institutional training in language, cultural considerations, and 
instructional techniques as qualifications in their basic specialty.  These 
personnel should be extensively used to train HN forces and facilitate 
liaison with the HN.234 
DoD has a force already trained and able to execute FID operations.  Conventional forces 
or interagency personnel could augment as needed.  For larger combined conventional 
exercises SOF could act as liaison elements between the host nation and conventional 
forces.  By using SOF primarily DoD is still able to concentrate conventional forces on 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
2. Unconventional Warfare 
Unconventional Warfare like FID requires small teams to operate in remote 
hazardous conditions.  UW is a core mission for SOF, specifically SF, and should be the 
primary personnel to conduct UW.  If the President of the United States determines that 
UW operations should be covert then within DoD SOF forces are best suited, but would 
fall under the restriction of Title 50, Chapter 15, subchapter III, section 413b. 
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Each finding shall specify each department, agency, or entity of the United 
States Government authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any 
significant way in such action. Any employee, contractor, or contract 
agent of a department, agency, or entity of the United States Government 
other than the Central Intelligence Agency directed to participate in any 
way in a covert action shall be subject either to the policies and 
regulations of the Central Intelligence Agency, or to written policies or 
regulations adopted by such department, agency, or entity, to govern such 
participation.235 
Conventional forces and interagency personnel as required by the mission can 
also augment SOF. 
3. Direct Engagement 
Any component of DoD is capable of conducting DE operations.  A troops to task 
analysis should be conducted by decision makers to determine the best DoD asset to use 
to conduct each specific DE operation. 
4. Intelligence 
As mentioned in the overall strategy the SFGCIN personnel would perform the 
intelligence node.  For further details see Optimizing Army Special Forces Leaders in a 
Global Counter-Insurgency Network by Joshua H. Walker and Eric J. Deal.  Interagency 
personnel as needed could augment the SFGCIN.  Midlevel SF officers are the nucleus of 
the SFGCIN. 
5. Regional Headquarters Hub 
The regional headquarters is responsible for the command and control of the FID, 
UW, DE, and intelligence nodes.  As such it should be capable of providing support to 
those elements, which for UW and certain DE missions would require additional SOF 
assets.  There fore a Joint Special Operations Task Force should serve as the regional 
headquarters hub. 
6. Higher Headquarters Hub 
As stated in Chapter II SOCOM was given the lead for combating the GWOT, 
therefore SOCOM should fill the role of the higher headquarters hub linking all regional 
headquarters together.  
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7. Recommended Force of Choice  
Special Forces soldiers are ideally suited to carry out two out of the three actions 
arms of the Non-Conventional Interdiction strategy.  FID and UW are core tasks of SF 
and are trained upon.  In addition midlevel SF officers are ideally suited to man the 
SFGCIN.   
The United States Special Forces (USSF or SF), from its official inception in 
1952, continues to influence world politics as an underlying force of deterrence.  Only 
recently have current events brought this elite organization to the forefront of American 
strategic thought.  As such, organizational models of structure and employment, with 
tactical and operational successes, have been realized during the GWOT, with campaigns 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines.   
Far from being the Nation’s catch all deterrent solution, this capability, in effect, 
carries ample credibility and stability to stand as an effective deterrent tactic for the 
United States.236  The use of SF is credible. Competing nations recognize the inherent 
threat that such a deployment of capabilities entails, and the message that the United 
States is relaying.  Nations understand this strategic communication.   At the same time, 
utilization of SF is stable.  The United States, although sending a strong message with the 
deployment of the Special Forces in other than war scenarios, rarely provokes escalated 
response with such a maneuver, hence stability. 
The global effect of the United States Special Forces on global terrorism, the 
insurgents’ state sponsors, or any other nation the U.S. wishes to influence, stems not 
from the Special Forces’ ability to conduct kinetic operations, but from their presence and 
capabilities as soldiers, statesmen and sensors.  SF also stands as the United States’ 
primary military instrument shaping U.S. ground truth relations around the globe.  As the 
recognized preeminent guerrilla force, and subsequent COIN force, Special Forces 
continues to not only train fledgling or reconstituted armies, help form internal stability 
mechanisms, and develop international relations between the U.S. and other countries, 
but also mold the mindset or strategies of those nations through close interaction. 
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Regardless of the mode of operation, SF’s methods separate and exemplify its 
capability as a deterrent mechanism for the United States of America.  As national 
sensors, the Green Berets operate in the open and/or behind the lines.  Information and 
actionable intelligence is not only generated from the trench-coated spy, or the 
confessions of a captured enemy, but also from the daily interactions of SF soldiers while 
visiting the local market, or serving at an embassy.  Either way, this soldier’s situational 
awareness weighs heavily on the minds it opposes.  The insurgent or government force is 
already taxed and concerned with daily operations and a life dominated by conflict, 
extending from the lowest operator to the highest national decision maker.  While not 
only worried about the obvious kinetic operations that Special Forces conducts, resulting 
in direct physical destruction of the adversary, the insurgent or nation influenced must 
also redouble its efforts in securing and safeguarding its supporting infrastructure: that 
which SF targets non-kinetically, such as popular support, organizational structure, 
operational information and material support channels.  The United States thus maintains 
such a decisive point of influence with Special Forces.  Trained in kinetic action, this 
adaptive individual is also highly skilled in the non-kinetic applications of influence from 
the battlefield, to the elders’ tent, to the conference table. And, far from being just 
America’s “Global Scouts”, this entity has the functionality to operate, when needed, on 





V. IS THE STRATEGY BALANCED? 237 
By using Art Lykke’s stool model a strategists is afforded an opportunity to 
examine the strategy to see if it is balanced.  In Richard Yarger’s piece Towards A 
Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model Yarger 
proposes three questions to test strategy.238  The three questions are:  
• Is it suitable?   
• Is it feasible?   
• Is it acceptable?239  
These three questions will help determine any shortcomings of the strategy.240  The 
answers will dictate whether to lengthen or shorten a leg (ends, ways, and means) of the 
stool to achieve the required balance.  If one leg is to long the strategy is accepting some 
risk in one area. 
A. SUITABILITY 
The Non-Conventional Interdiction strategy will produce the desired effects as it 
relates to the objectives.  The proposed strategy directly supports the following objectives 





                                                 
237 The structure for the “Is the Strategy Balanced?” grew out a paper by Glenn Johnson, Carl Morris, 
and David Sears, “Global War on Terrorism Ground Special Operation Forces Foreign Internal Defense 
Strategy,” (Unpublished paper, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006). 
238 Yarger. The stool concept is a very simplified way to look at strategy.  Yarger states “in the Lykke 
model the ends are objectives, the ways are the concepts for accomplishing the objectives, and the means 
are the resources for supporting the concepts.”  Each leg of the stool represents the objectives (ends), 
concepts (ways), or resources (means).  Each leg must be of equal length (importance) to maintain the 
balance and minimize risk. 
239 Ibid. 




  FID UW DE 
Champion aspirations for human dignity 1 2   
Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent 
attacks against us and our friends 1 2   
Work with others to defuse regional conflicts 1 2 3 
Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends 
with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 1 3 2 
Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the 
infrastructure of democracy 1 2   
Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of 
global power241 1     
Prevent attacks by terrorist networks 1 2 3 
Deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them 1 3 2 
Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states   1 2 
Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and 
launching pad for terror   1 2 
Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the 
ideology of terrorism242 1 2   
Secure the United States from direct attack 1 2 3 
Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action 1 3 2 
Strengthen alliances and partnerships 1 2   
Establish favorable security conditions243 1 2   
Deny terrorists what they need to operate and survive 1 2 3 
Enable partner nations to counter terrorism 1 2   
Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled 
materials and increase capacity for consequence management 3 2 1 
Defeat terrorists and their organizations 2 3 1 
Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with 
other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations 1 2 3 
Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological 
support for terrorism244 1 2   
 
Figure 8.   Non-Conventional Interdiction Strategy support to existing strategic 
objectives (the number defines the preferred way to support each of the 
objectives)                                                  
241 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, 1. 
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The strategy will not provide quick results, but will offer a realistic approach to 
continue efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and still wage the GWOT.  Using an indirect 
approach to promote cooperation amongst fellow nations will also indirectly promote 
democracy and U.S. values around the globe. 
B. FEASIBILITY 
Is DoD capable of carrying out this strategy?  DoD has the means to carry out the 
strategy as proposed in the long-term.  The 2006 QDR calls for an increase in SOF and 
conventional forces.  Until the called for growth is achieved DoD would have to accept 
some risk either in not fully implementing the strategy or in force levels supporting 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  With the current operational tempo in Iraq and 
Afghanistan as high as it is DoD would pay a price to fully implement this strategy.  
Operational readiness rates would decrease in addition to possible troop burnout.   
To mitigate the risk DoD has two feasible options, phased implementation or a 
reduction of SOF support to Iraq and Afghanistan and use SOF as a force multiplier.  In 
the phased implementation DoD would implement the strategy in priority countries only 
and as troop levels decreased in Iraq and Afghanistan other countries would be added.  In 
the second option SOF force levels would be refocused to concentrate on the GWOT and 
allow the conventional military to concentrate on Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring 
Freedom.  SOF forces are needed to support both operations, but a thorough troop to task 
analysis should be conducted to ensure current SOF levels are sufficient.  
In order to effectively implement the SFGCIN proposed by Josh Walker and Eric 
Deal as part of the Non-Conventional Interdiction strategy the personnel management of 
mid-level Special Forces officers would have to occur.   
C. ACCEPTABILITY 
Are the cost justified to achieve the objectives?  Is the strategy acceptable to U.S. 
values?  In the Non-Conventional Interdiction strategy the cost do justify the means.  
Implementation of the strategy allows DoD to tackle the GWOT without massive 
reorganization or increased costs.  The strategy is sustainable for DoD.  The political cost 
of implementing the strategy is also acceptable.  By backing off of rhetoric and the use of 
a large number of troops the strategy is likely to fly under the radar of Congressional and 
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World leaders.  The strategy does not alter U.S. values and indirectly promotes them on a 
global scale.  Lastly this strategy actually focuses on the GWOT and brings it back to 
forefront of DoD and National Security concerns.  The strategy is acceptable.  
D. IMPLEMENTATION 
In order to implement this recommended strategy the President, politicians, and 
the U.S. public must be convinced that it will work and the strategy must be monitored. 
The Secretary of Defense should present the strategy to the President of the 
United States.  Once the President has bought into the strategy, his staff can present it to 
Congress and the U.S. public stressing the need to bring the GWOT to the forefront of 
U.S. military affairs.  An admission that the current approach is not working and there is 
a need to try something different should go a long way to achieving Congressional and 
public buy in. 
Part of achieving the necessary political and public buy-in is convincing each that 
there is a system in place to monitor and a process to reassess the strategy.  The process 
should be similar to the QDR, but occur yearly.  The personnel that conduct the 
reassessment should include personnel within DoD, but also at the National Security 
level.  Including outside personnel will allow for a fresh perspective and ensure that the 
strategy meets with the President’s priorities. 
E. HYPOTHETICAL APPLICATION 
Let us assume that while the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan continue the 
Iranian situation begins to heat up, simultaneously negotiations with North Korea sour, 
and the U.S. public is demanding the U.S. put more emphasis on the GWOT.  Assuming 
that current force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan must be sustained what military options 
are available to the President of the United States? 
Even ruling out conventional attacks on Iran and North Korea with the Non-
Conventional Interdiction Strategy the President has several options.  FID is ruled out 
since both of those countries are hostile. 
• Conduct UW in Iran and North Korea. 
• Conduct DE strikes in Iran and North Korea. 
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• Conduct UW in Iran and DE in North Korea. 
• Conduct DE in Iran and UW in North Korea. 
Since it is alleged that North Korea has nuclear weapons the U.S. should rule out any DE 
strikes and even a UW campaign.  A DE strike or a UW campaign on North Korea would 
be acceptable as it would meet U.S. objectives, is militarily feasible, but the risk of a 
nuclear confrontation or escalation of tensions between North and South Korea is 
unacceptable.  Instead the U.S. should continue to engage North Korea using information 
and diplomatic elements of national power.  Simultaneously with those options DoD can 
continue to conduct FID in priority countries that are supporting and assisting in the 
combat of the GWOT.   
 The President would need to decide whether to use DE strikes or a UW campaign 
against Iran.  Louis Rene Beres argues that “Precise defensive attacks against Iran's 
nuclear assets would be effective – and they would be entirely legal.”245  Beres claims 
 It would be lawful because the US and/or Israel would be acting in 
appropriate self-defense. Both countries could act on behalf of the 
international community and could do so lawfully without wider approval. 
The right of self-defense by forestalling an attack has a long and 
authoritative history in international law.246   
Beres also asserts that the U.S. has a plan called the “McInerney Plan” that calls “for an 
immediate strike force to hit Iran’s nuclear development facilities, command and control 
centers, integrated air defenses, selected Air Force and Navy units, and its Shahab-3 
missiles.”247  The plan could be carried out by the U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft or 
surface-to-surface missiles.  
 What consequences might be the result of DE strikes on Iran’s nuclear program?  
Would it truly deter Iran from trying to join the nuclear capable nations?  In the same 
article Beres discusses one consequence, “such strikes would probably entail high civilian 
casualties because Iran has deliberately placed sensitive military assets amid civilian 
                                                 
245 Louis Rene Beres, “The Case for Strikes against Iran: Diplomacy alone won't stop Iran's nuclear 
ambitions,” csmonitor.com, 8 May 2007 [Website]; available from 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0508/p09s01-coop.html?page=1; Internet, accessed 19 May 2007. 
246 Ibid., 2. 
247 Ibid. 
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populations – an international crime called "perfidy."248  Most likely Iran would continue 
to pursue such a program, but the strike would force the program underground (making it 
harder to strike) and/or Iran would continue co-locate facilities next to key civilian sites.  
World reaction could range from acceptance to outrage.  A DE strike on Iran would be 
acceptable as it would meet U.S. objectives, is militarily feasible, but the risk of 
excessive collateral damage and the potential loss of world political capitol is 
unacceptable. 
 Ruling out DE strikes on Iran, the President is left with the UW option.  Iran does 
have existing opposition/separatist groups that U.S. forces could work by, with, and 
through.  Here are some of the Iranian opposition and separatists groups: 
• National Council of Resistance of Iran.249 
• People’s Mujahideen of Iran (PMOI)250 a.k.a. Mujahedin-e Khalq 
Organization (MEK).251 
• Al-Ahwaz Arab People’s Democratic Front.252 
• Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz.253 
• Jundallah a.k.a. People’s Resistance Movement of Iran (PRMI)-Baloch 
Nationalists.254 
• Balochistan People's Party (BPP).255 
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The most likely group that the U.S. can approach is the NCRI-PMOI-MEK.256  In 
a February 2006 Christian Science Monitor article “Raymond Tanter, a former National 
Security Council Middle East specialist during the George H.W. Bush administration” 
states “Other opposition groups really don’t exist,” and “If we are serious about working 
with groups from within, it will have to be with the MEK, because there’s no other 
opposition force the regime cares about.”257  The MEK appears to be a viable opposition 
group. 
Estimates place MEK's worldwide membership in the several thousands, 
with large pockets in Paris and other major European capitals. In Iraq, 
roughly 3,400 MEK members are gathered under Coalition supervision at 
Camp Ashraf, the MEK's main compound north of Baghdad, where they 
have been designated as "protected persons" under Article 27 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention…As a condition of the 2003 cease-fire 
agreement, the MEK relinquished more than 2,000 tanks; armored 
personnel carriers; and heavy artillery.258  
The NCRI-PMOI-MEK is listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of 
State under the title Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK).259  A decision to remove 
the NCRI-PMOI-MEK from the U.S. terrorist list might receive Congressional support 
and approval.  The same Christian Science article states “several members of Congress 
are pressing to remove the MEK from the terror-group list.”260  Additionally member 
countries of the European Union might also support such a decision.  The NCRI makes 
the following claims regarding International support: 
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• In 2004 120 members of European Parliament and some European countries 
governments support the NCRI and request the removal of the PMOI from the 
terrorist lists.261   
• In 2002 “150 members of the US House of Representatives expressed their 
support for the democratic objectives of the National Council of Resistance of 
Iran and of its President-elect, Mrs. Maryam Rajavi.”262 
• In 2001 “32 American senators: "US policy should reach out to those working 
to establish a democratic and pluralistic system in the country. In this context, 
support for the democratic goals of the National Council of Resistance of Iran 
and its President-elect, Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, whose objectives are supported 
by the majority of Iranians, can contribute to peace, human rights and regional 
stability."263 
• In 2000 “228 members of the US House of Representatives: "It is only our 
support for the Iranian people's aspirations for fundamental change and the 
democratic goals of the National Council of Resistance, that can contribute to 
the promotion of peace, human rights and stability in this part of the 
world."264 
How would the rest of the Middle East react to a decision to recognize the NCRI-
PMOI-MEK and support an insurgency within Iran?  We can speculate that the Sunni 
Middle East would most likely support a U.S. decision to support an insurgency in Shia 
Iran.  If the U.S. were to expand the groups it approached to include the Al-Ahwaz Arab 
People’s Democratic Front and the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz 
the traditional Arab states in the Gulf region would be more likely support the decision. 
There are two other major groups that must be considered, Israel and al Qaeda.  
Israel would likely support the action, because as was demonstrated when Israel struck 
Saddam’s nuclear program Israel will not tolerate a nuclear Muslim state so close to its 
borders.  Al Qaeda would attempt to use the support to an insurgency as a propaganda 
tool.  Al Qaeda would see the U.S. as attacking Islam again and try to rally Muslims 
against the U.S. 
 Looking at the Iran scenario we can see that using U.S. sponsored UW is a 
suitable solution to achieve U.S. objectives.  Iran is currently pursuing the ability to 
                                                 





generate nuclear energy which could lead to nuclear weapons.  Additionally it is alleged 
that Iran is interfering with U.S. efforts in Iraq.  The UW course of action supports the 
following U.S. objectives: 
• Champion aspirations for human dignity. 
• Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).265 
• Deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use. 
• Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states. 
• Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching 
pad for terror.266 
• Establish favorable security conditions.267 
• Deny terrorists what they need to operate and survive. 
• Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials and 
increase capacity for consequence management. 
• Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other 
U.S. Government agencies and partner nations. 
• Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support 
for terrorism.268 
It should not be expected that these objectives will be achieved right away, but over the 
long-term they are achievable. 
With the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and assuming the Iranian 
opposition/separatists groups are willing to work with the U.S. UW is the only feasible 
option available to DoD to topple the Iranian regime.  DoD would have to redirect some 
SOF forces, specifically Special Forces A-teams, but would be able to maintain the bulk 
of DoD forces supporting Iraq and Afghanistan.  Additionally U.S. close air support
                                                 
265 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington 
DC: Executive Office of the President, March 2006), 1.  
266 The White House, The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, 1. 
267 United States Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of 
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268 United States Department of Defense, The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on 
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 90 
assets might be needed to support the UW campaign.  The commitment level of the U.S. 
to supporting an insurgency would determine if SF and close air support assets would be 
committed to actively participating. 
If the President and Congress determine that Iran is a legitimate threat to U.S. 
forces in Iraq and U.S. interests employing the UW component of the Non-Conventional 
Interdiction Strategy is an acceptable option for dealing with a state sponsor of terrorism 
that is pursuing nuclear energy, and is allegedly interfering in U.S. efforts in Iraq.  UW 
can be conducted covertly to try and minimize world outrage.  There might be a high 
political cost (since Congress is war weary) for taking action against Iran, but UW 
presents the lowest cost for toppling the Iranian regime. 
If Iran were to find out that the U.S. was supporting an insurgency within Iran 
what kind of reaction could the U.S. expect from Iran?  Iran has several options: 
• Iran could express outrage in the media in which the U.S. could conduct 
negotiations with Iran promising to withdraw all support to the Iranian 
insurgency if Iran stops pursuing nuclear energy and interfering in Iraq.   
• Iran could mobilize its Army and invade Iraq attacking U.S. forces.  This 
would be the worst case scenario for U.S. forces in Iraq and would bear a high 
political cost for the President. 
• Iran could encourage Hezbollah attacks on U.S. personnel, assets, and 
interests.  This would be the absolute worst case scenario for the U.S. as a 
country. 
If the U.S. were to attack Iran conventionally Iran’s most likely response would 
be option 2 while expressing outrage in the world forum.  Iran’s response could be 
virtually the same, but by using UW instead of a conventional attack the U.S. would be 
minimizing direct risk by exposing fewer troops. As the reader can see the options 
presented by the Non-Conventional Interdiction Strategy are viable military options.  The 
UW option for the Iran scenario is suitable, feasible, and acceptable. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
International terrorists survive and operate much, as would an internal national 
revolution.  In leading this fight against global terrorism, it would seem obvious to 
forward this proposed strategy with the mechanisms already aligned to defeating it.  This 
concept has escaped the notice of policy makers in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
continues to remain under-utilized around the world as the U.S. continues to rely on 
kinetic/conventional, versus non-kinetic, civil-military methods of operation.  Limited 
operational success primarily stems from the Special Forces (SF) and their understanding 
of interagency coordination, insurgency, and an application of the IDAD, but is contained 
at only the lowest tactical levels and typically not coordinated or supported by 
conventional forces.  To the rest of the military, SF remains the force of choice to “kick 
over rocks and see what turns up.”269 
This thesis has argued that the U.S. and DoD’s GWOT strategies are overly direct 
in nature and can not be sustained for a “long war” nor are suited for the type of threat 
that the U.S. faces.  The Non-conventional interdiction Strategy offers a viable solution 
for DoD to implement in the conduct of the GWOT.  The strategy still allows DoD to 
focus on the ability to fight a conventional enemy in a conventional manner.  The primary 
use of indirect methods coupled with prioritized surgical strikes provides a realistic 
approach for the DoD.   
In order to have a truly balanced GWOT strategy a National GWOT strategy that 
encompasses all elements of national power must be developed. It is important to note 
that this strategy is not a quick results strategy.  It is a long-term strategy that uses SOF 
forces to lower the financial and manpower costs.  Although this strategy is less 
manpower intensive than a standard conventional approach, resources are finite and as 
such areas to implement it need to be prioritized. 
                                                 
269 Comments made to the author by a senior J-3 SOD official at the Pentagon during a capabilities 
brief and in response to a question referencing Special Forces’ overall COIN Campaign Strategy. 
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By adopting our proposal, the United States can put the leading role in the Global 
War on Terrorism in the hands of the people who understand it the best.  By leading the 
effort using a counterinsurgency strategy, U.S. Special Forces teams can help the U.S. 
achieve victory at the smallest cost and in the minimum amount of time.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In essence, our basic recommendation to the hypothesis put forth by this paper is 
the new strategic focus of Non-Conventional warfare, described earlier in Chapter IV.  
Through out the course of doing the research for this thesis several other problems and 
questions were encountered.  These problems should be further researched, but we felt it 
necessary to briefly address some of these issues as a further take away for the reader.  As 
stated earlier to effectively fight the GWOT it will take all elements of national power to 
execute. 
 Problem:  Lack of a central agency or organization charged with the 
implementation and conduct of the GWOT. 
 Discussion:  One of the major problems with the conduct of the GWOT is 
leadership.  Leadership as defined as “the ability to guide, direct, or influence people”.270  
Who is in charge for the conduct of the GWOT? 
Michael Vickers’ Congressional testimony states that the National Counter 
Terrorism Center (NCTC) is “charged with national strategic and operational planning 
[but]… lacks the authority and capabilities to fulfill its mandate.”271  In addition to the 
NCTC, the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), USSOCOM, 
Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs), the CIA Counter Terrorism Center, the 
Department of State, and the Department of Homeland Security all have some 
responsibility for the GWOT either at the strategic or operational level.272  Many 
organizations involved in the GWOT, each with no authority over the other, create an 
environment for bureaucratic confusion.  
                                                 
270 “Leadership,” Encarta World English Dictionary, (n.d.) [Website]; available from 
http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_/leadership.html; Internet; accessed 24 February 2007. 
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272 Ibid., 3. 
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Within DoD, SOCOM was given “the lead in planning the war on terror” by 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.273  The President shifted SOCOM’s role from a 
supporting command to a supported command with the 2005 Unified Command Plan.  
The “2005 Unified Command Plan gives USSOCOM… responsibility to plan, 
synchronize for DOD, and, when directed, execute Special Operations in the war on 
terror.”274  Being a supported command is problematic.  SOCOM does not have any 
specific geographic responsibility.  The GCCs are responsible for specific geographic 
regions.  With the GCCs and Commander of SOCOM all being the same rank, this 
creates the same situation as seen at the national level.  The GCCs report directly to the 
Secretary of Defense as does the Commander of SOCOM. 
The conduct of the GWOT will continue to be disjointed and fragmented until one 
organization is in charge that has the power and authority to unite all supporting 
governmental agencies.  
Recommendation 1:  Use existing law and empower the Committee on 
Transnational Threats.  The National Security Act of 1947 establishes “within the 
National Security Council a committee to be known as Committee on Transnational 
Threats.”275  The act specifies the following members:  Director of Central Intelligence, 
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs (also directed to serve as the chairperson), and 
such other members as the President may designate.276  “The function of the Committee 
shall be to coordinate and direct the activities of the United States Government relating to 
combating transnational threats.”277  Transnational threats could be expanded to include
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the GWOT.  The chairperson title might be moved to someone else, a person whose sole 
focus is fighting the GWOT; a person similar to the position of “War Czar” that President 
Bush is trying to establish.278 
Lastly, the President would need to expand the already existing tasks and 
authorities as defined in Section 101, paragraph i-4 to include tasking authority to 
control, direct, and synchronize all elements of national power in relation to the GWOT.  
It is essential that this organization has the authority to task the various agencies to 
execute the GWOT. 
Recommendation 2:  Give operational control of SOCOM to the Committee on 
Transnational Threats.  Give SOCOM tasking authority to task other DoD organizations, 
specifically the GCCs, in the conduct of the GWOT.   
And it is with this final capstone thought that we close this discussion of an 
alternative to the current DoD strategic engagement to the GWOT.  By identifying the 
threat with clearly understood concepts, already ingrained in the non-conventional units 
within the military, a more obvious solution comes to the surface.   Irregular threats and 
strategies should be preempted and countered with irregular capabilities, those that the 
United States Special Operations Forces have honed since their inception. 
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